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7 Executive Summary
EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
The Report Cybersecurity – Our Digital Anchor 
brings together research from different disciplinary 
fields of the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the 
European Commission's science and knowledge 
service. It provides multidimensional insights  
into the growth of cybersecurity over the last  
40 years, identifying weaknesses in the current 
digital evolution and their impacts on European 
citizens and industry. The report also sets out  
the elements that potentially could be used to 
shape a brighter and more secure future for 
Europe’s digital society, taking into account  
the new cybersecurity challenges triggered by  
the COVID-19 crisis.
According to some projections, cybercrime will 
cost the world EUR 5.5 trillion by the end of 2020, 
up from EUR 2.7 trillion in 2015, due in part to 
the exploitation of the COVID-19 pandemic by 
cyber criminals. This figure represents the largest 
transfer of economic wealth in history, more 
profitable than the global trade in all major 
illegal drugs combined, putting at risk incentives 
for innovation and investment.
Furthermore, cyber threats have moved beyond 
cybercrime and have become a matter of national 
security. The report addresses relevant issues 
including: 
• Critical Infrastructures: today, digital 
technologies are at the heart of all our critical 
infrastructures. Hence, their cybersecurity  
is already – and will become increasingly –  
a matter of critical infrastructure protection 
(see the cases of Estonia and Ukraine).
• Magnitude of impact: the number of citizens, 
organisations and businesses impacted 
simultaneously by a single attack can be huge. 
• Complexity and duration of attacks: attacks 
are becoming more and more complex, 
demonstrating attackers’ enhanced planning 
capabilities. Moreover, attacks are often only 
detected post-mortem1. 
• Computational power: the spread of malware 
also able to infect mobile and Internet of 
Things (IoT) devices (as in the case of Mirai 
botnet), hugely increases the distributed 
computational power of the attacks 
(especially in the case of denial of services 
(DoS)). The same phenomenon makes the 
eradication of an attack much more difficult. 
• Societal aspects: cyber threats can have  
a potentially massive impact on society, 
 up to the point of undermining the trust 
citizens have in digital services. As such 
services are intertwined with our daily life, 
Cybersecurity
is no longer
a technological
‘option’, but  
a societal need.
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any successful cybersecurity strategy must 
take into consideration the human and, more 
generally, societal aspects. 
 
This report shows how the evolution of 
cybersecurity has always been determined 
by a type of cause-and-effect trend: the rise 
in new digital technologies followed by the 
discovery of new vulnerabilities, for which new 
cybersecurity measures must be identified. 
However, the magnitude and impacts of today's 
cyber attacks are now so critical that the digital 
society must prepare itself before attacks happen. 
Cybersecurity resilience along with measures to 
deter attacks and new ways to avoid software 
vulnerabilities should be enhanced, developed  
and supported.
The ‘leitmotiv’ of this report is the need  
for a paradigm shift in the way cybersecurity  
is designed and deployed, to make it more 
proactive and better linked to societal needs.  
Given that data flows and information are  
the lifeblood of today’s digital society, 
cybersecurity is essential for ensuring that 
digital services work safely and securely while 
simultaneously guaranteeing citizens’ privacy  
and data protection. Thus, cybersecurity is 
evolving from a technological ‘option’ to  
a societal must. 
From big data to hyperconnectivity, from edge 
computing to the IoT, to artificial intelligence (AI), 
quantum computing and blockchain technologies, 
the ‘nitty-gritty’ details of cybersecurity 
implementation will always remain field-specific 
due to specific sectoral constraints. This brings 
with it inherent risks of a digital society with 
heterogeneous and inconsistent levels of security.  
To counteract this, we argue for a coherent, 
cross-sectoral and cross-societal cybersecurity 
strategy which can be implemented across all 
layers of European society. 
This strategy should cover not only the 
technological aspects but also the societal 
dimensions of ‘behaving in a cyber secure way’.
Consequently, the report concludes by presenting  
a series of possible actions instrumental to building 
a European digital society secure by design.
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INTRODUCTION
We are living in an era of great opportunities 
enabled by digital technologies: access to 
information and knowledge has never been  
as easy as it is today. Global economic growth2 
and human well-being are becoming increasingly 
dependent on the adoption of digital technologies. 
However, this intertwining of digital technologies 
in our daily lives brings with it heightened 
vulnerability to the deliberate exploitation of 
unsecure digital systems. This increases the 
potential impact of cyber attacks while reducing 
the advantages of the digitalisation of our society. 
To understand why cybersecurity is so central, 
we need look no further than the COVID-19 
crisis which has triggered an increase in the 
cybersecurity risk facing European businesses, 
governments and citizens. Cyber attacks have 
become more frequent as the weaknesses 
resulting from the focus on fighting the pandemic 
have been exploited.
Digital technologies are currently at the heart 
of all our critical infrastructures. Hence, their 
cybersecurity is already, and is becoming 
increasingly, a matter of national security. 
Therefore, cybersecurity is both costly and crucial. 
The number of citizens impacted simultaneously 
by a single cyber incident can be huge as  
a consequence of the pervasiveness of connected 
devices: 3 billion accounts in the attack on Yahoo 
in 2013, 77 million users in the attack on Sony 
PS3 in 2011, 1.3 million and 250 000 impacted 
citizens, respectively, in the attacks on Estonia  
and Ukraine in 2017, and 7 major security 
incidents in December 2019 alone (CSIS, 2020), 
just to cite a few examples.  
At the same time, cyber attacks are also  
becoming more and more complex, demonstrating 
the attackers’ enhanced planning capabilities  
and knowledge. An example of the growing 
complexity is the spread of malware able to  
infect both mobile and IoT devices, hugely 
amplifying the distributed computational  
power of cyber attacks while making it more 
difficult to effectively mitigate an attack.  
Time is a crucial  
factor: we need  
to move quickly  
in an attempt to 
reduce the attacker’s 
advantage.
   Global 
economic growth 
and human 
well-being 
are increasingly 
dependent upon  
the adoption of 
digital technologies.
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As cyber attackers operate outside the norms  
of regulation and law, this flexibility gives  
them a significant advantage over defenders  
who normally do not enjoy such freedom.  
The attackers have the crucial advantage  
of time which in cyberspace can be measured  
in milliseconds.
Contrary to popular belief, cybersecurity is not 
merely a matter of technologies. Rather, it has  
an impact on society and is influenced by the 
attitude of individuals while they are ‘living their 
digital life’. Their preferences, desired digital services 
and the way in which they are used are the first 
considerations when trying to design a more secure 
cyberspace. Once again, the explosion of teleworking 
and online schooling during the first half of 2020 
due to the COVID-19 crisis and, as a consequence, 
the higher number of cyber attacks show the 
extent to which our lives are intrinsically dependent 
on digital services and why we need urgently to 
increase their security. Cybersecurity is thus  
a very heterogeneous and multi-sectorial domain 
combining diverse needs, expertise and constraints.  
Thus, the scope of this report is twofold: 
• It gives the reader clear elements to reflect  
on the weaknesses of the digital evolution  
and the resulting impact on European society. 
• It proposes the components which  
could potentially shape a new secure 
European society. 
    Contrary to 
common belief, 
cybersecurity  
is not merely  
a matter of 
technologies.
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To achieve this scope, the report is organised  
as follows: Chapter 1, uses a brief historical 
excursion to provide the basic elements for 
understanding what cybersecurity is today. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 analyse why the societal 
and technological transformations of our society 
require a more fit-for-purpose cybersecurity,  
while Chapter 5 draws a picture of the evolution  
of cybersecurity threats and related risks.  
At the time of writing of this report the world  
is facing the COVID-19 pandemic. Chapter 6 
provides a snapshot of the cyber threats and 
challenges caused by this exceptional event, 
magnifying one more time how cybersecurity 
is today a cornerstone of our society, especially 
in times of crisis. On the basis of the evidence 
presented in the previous sections, Chapter 7 
suggests a number of possible strategies to 
mitigate cyber threats. The report concludes  
by identifying six possible policy intervention  
areas to foster a European digital society  
secure by design.
Introduction
   Cyber  
attackers  
do not adhere  
to regulations,  
ethical norms  
or cultural 
traditions.
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SUMMARY
The development of the internet during the last decades didn’t happen without events 
characterizing the vulnerability of the network. Over the years, a wide set of policy 
initiatives have been taken to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability, of data 
and information. Increasing and emerging threats have always gone in parallel with 
new technologies and require therefore innovative mitigation measures. The cyber-
security concept must be extended to other disciplines and combined with the ex-
isting applications and technologies in the digital society. Investments are needed 
to strengthen security, but is it today possible to determine univocally the level of 
cybersecurity of our society? 
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CYBERSECURITY: 
EVOLUTION OF 
A MULTIFACETED 
DISCIPLINE
Today, cybersecurity plays a central role  
in guaranteeing the security of our society. 
However, cybersecurity is neither a term defined 
in a straightforward way nor simply a well-bound 
sub-domain of a single academic area. Over  
the years, it has become a highly cross-border  
and continuously evolving discipline, making it 
difficult to grasp its full extent at a single glance. 
A brief evolution of cybersecurity is provided here 
leading to a discussion on the situation today.
 1.1. 40 years of cybersecurity
This section highlights some insights into the joint 
evolution of digital technologies, cyber threats  
and cybersecurity. 
1970s and 1980s – the early days
Cybersecurity’s roots go back to the 1970s,  
the time of ARPANET, considered to be the 
precursor of the internet. The first early examples 
of malicious software and computer intrusions 
date back to that decade. In 1983, Fred Cohen 
presented a program capable of spreading  
itself from one machine to another, carried as  
a parasite in a legitimate application, and basically 
demonstrating the first computer malware  
(Cohen, 1984). In 1988, the first malware aimed  
at disrupting services was deployed causing  
a massive DoS in ARPANET by infecting 10 % of 
the computers connected to the network (Kienzle 
and Elder, 2003).  
Consequently, policymakers took action: the US 
Administration released the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act in 1986 (Doyle, 2014), followed by the 
Computer Security Act of 1987 and, in 1990, by 
the Computer Misuse Act in the United Kingdom 
(Great Britain, 1990). 
1990s – the birth and popularisation  
of the internet and World Wide Web
The 1990s were marked by the birth and 
subsequent popularisation of the World Wide Web 
(WWW) and internet. In this context, software 
and network security started to become seen 
as a key priority by industry and governmental 
This epochal shift  
is a journey, and  
like every journey,  
the road is paved  
by risks and threats.
organisations. New standards providing additional 
security requirements on network protocols 
started to emerge along with good practices3. 
Inevitably, the growing popularisation of  
the internet led to an increase in the attack 
surface. Internet protocols were initially deployed 
with usability in mind but without any security 
considerations. Inner flaws started to be exploited 
to launch massive attacks, such as the Melissa 
worm (Kienzle and Elder, 2003), infecting 
thousands of computers worldwide and disrupting 
email services.
2000s – The modern digital era
The first decade of the millennium was marked  
by the birth of Web 2.04. In 2000, the number  
of internet users exceeded 300 million, with 73 % 
of them in the top 10 richest countries (Pingdom, 
2010). This massive adoption opened the door to 
a wider range of attacks, such as the ‘ILOVEYOU’ 
worm, which spread like wildfire in May 2000, 
infecting over 50 million systems worldwide during 
its first 10 days. In 2001, the Council of Europe 
proposed the Convention on Cybercrime, the first 
international treaty on crimes committed via  
the internet, which has been signed and ratified  
by more than 60 countries since then (Council  
of Europe, 2001). In 2002, the EU adopted  
the ePrivacy Directive (European Parliament  
and Council of the European Union, 2002) 
to safeguard the confidentiality of electronic 
communications in the EU; while in 2003,  
the US Department of Homeland Security 
launched its National Cyber Security Division.
2010s – A race for digital transformation  
and cyber attacks
Throughout this decade, the number of cyber 
physical systems5 continued to increase  
(a new generation of medical devices, industrial 
automation and control systems, etc.). This era 
was also characterised by the emergence of  
the big data phenomenon. These trends, paired 
with the greater hyperconnectivity of devices  
and the upsurge of AI, created new challenges  
for cybersecurity. 
Cyber criminals also capitalised on the opportunities  
offered by these developments. In 2012, a wave 
of cyber attacks impacted millions of users 
worldwide who saw their personal data leaked 
online and their credit cards stolen6. This new 
generation of cyber attacks was characterised 
by their impact which, in many cases, went 
far beyond the economic dimension7. Massive 
ransomware campaigns and global botnets 
hit millions of users worldwide in industry, 
government, academia and households alike. 
These attacks took advantage of the proliferation 
of connected devices, through prominent examples 
such as the WannaCry ransomware global 
outbreak (Smart, 2018) and the Mirai botnet 
(Antonakakis et al., 2017). 
Cybersecurity began to be placed at the centre  
of European policy initiatives8, such as the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Network 
Information and Security (NIS) Directive and  
the European Cybersecurity Act. 
The cybersecurity challenge ahead 
Looking at the past 40 years, three trends emerge: 
(1) The circular sequence of ‘new technology,  
new cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities,  
141. Cybersecurity: evolution of a multifaceted discipline
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wildfire in May 
2000, infecting over 
50 million systems 
worldwide during its 
first 10 days alone.
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new mitigations’; (2) the constant increase over 
the years of the potential magnitude of attacks  
in term of size of targets and impact; and (3)  
a general increase in the attack surface. The last 
trend is due to a wide number of factors, including 
the pervasiveness of digital activity in daily life 
and the massive diffusion of IoT.
As a result, digital society can no longer afford to 
be reactive, remediating cyber threats once they 
have occurred. The magnitude and impacts of 
today’s cyber attacks can be so devastating that 
our society needs to prepare for potential attacks. 
The targeting of hospitals and research centres by 
cyber criminals, including state-sponsored actors, 
during the COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated 
the current lack of globally agreed norms in 
cybersecurity and there is a growing realisation 
that some type of ‘digital Geneva Convention’  
is required. Indeed, back in 2012, former US  
Defense Secretary, Leon Panetta, first alluded 
to the potential for a ‘Cyber Pearl Harbor’ attack 
against the critical infrastructures of any nation 
state as being just around the corner.  
To this end, elements of cybersecurity resilience 
along with measures to deter and novel ways to 
avoid software vulnerabilities should be enhanced, 
developed and supported.
 1.2. Cybersecurity today
Cybersecurity has become a horizontal multi-
domain discipline encompassing many fields  
and approaches. Indeed, due to the links between 
the manifold aspects of our digital and physical 
lives, the concept of cybersecurity involves 
knowledge coming from many different,  
and sometimes very distant scientific disciplines 
(European Commission and Directorate-General 
for Research and Innovation, 2017). 
At the European level, cybersecurity is defined 
in Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 as 
‘the activities necessary to protect network and 
information systems, the users of such systems, 
and other persons affected by cyber threats’. 
Thus, it is not only a matter of foundational 
research (e.g. in cryptography) but also a matter 
of technology, societal position, education, culture 
and, ultimately, policies.
Attempts to find a correct definition for and to 
standardise the term from a European perspective 
have been collected by the European Union 
Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) (ENISA, 2016a), 
including common definitions and official attempts 
by organisations. For the sake of completeness, 
a short glossary of the most relevant definitions 
linked to cybersecurity is included in this report. 
From this list, according to the most authoritative 
standard ISO/IEC 27032:2012: ‘Cybersecurity’ 
is defined as the ‘preservation of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information in  
the cyberspace9’.  
   The potential 
for a ‘Cyber 
Pearl Harbor’ 
attack against 
the critical 
infrastructures  
of any nation state 
is just around  
the corner.
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Confidentiality, integrity and availability are  
often identified as the key pillars of cybersecurity. 
As a very general definition (Bishop, 2003), we can 
say that: 
• Confidentiality is the concealment of 
information or resources. 
• Integrity refers to the trustworthiness of data 
or resources (and is intended as a set  
of mechanisms to prevent unauthorised  
or improper changes). 
• Availability refers in general to the ability to 
legitimately use the information or resources 
(services) desired. 
Unfortunately, for practical purposes, this definition 
does not provide a lot of information, as recognised 
by cybersecurity expert Matt Bishop (Bishop, 2003) 
who notes that the interpretation of these three 
aspects varies according to a given context.
For instance, it can be said that cybersecurity 
is not only about data/information protection 
but includes all ‘things’ which are vulnerable via 
information and communications technology 
(ICT) – i.e. information in any form, and including 
things like cars, traffic lights, IoT appliances 
and unmanned aerial vehicles, to name but 
a few. In other words, it is impossible to address 
cybersecurity in absolute terms. The most viable 
solution is to leave the definition somewhat 
open and connect the practical meaning of 
cybersecurity to its many sectorial applications 
and problems. 
Nevertheless, understanding how exactly 
cybersecurity is connected to other technical 
disciplines and the technological areas which are 
its main drivers is a very important topic touching 
on many aspects of cybersecurity policymaking, 
such as: 
• the skills of a cybersecurity expert to be 
considered in creating and fostering coherent 
curricula in education across Europe; 
• the scientific domains to be boosted to 
enhance the advance of cybersecurity as  
a discipline; 
• the market domains to be stimulated to 
create a healthier European cybersecurity 
industry. 
On the basis of these considerations, in 2018,  
the European Commission published an 
overarching cybersecurity taxonomy (Nai Fovino 
et al., 2019), validated by key cybersecurity 
organisations and through a survey involving more 
than 700 European research centres (Lazari et al., 
2018). This taxonomy offers a clear and precise 
indication of the areas of fundamental research 
and the relevant sectorial domains. By combining 
    Cybersecurity 
began to be put 
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and the European 
Cybersecurity Act.
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both dimensions with existing applications  
and technologies in the digital society, a three-
dimensional representation of the cybersecurity 
realm can be obtained, as depicted in Figure 1.
Cybersecurity is shown as a large, multifaceted 
discipline rather than a sub-area of computer 
science. While it is involved everywhere, each 
cell of this cube requires particular theoretical 
approaches and specific technical implementation 
and skills.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: High-level view of the cybersecurity taxonomy
   Cybersecurity 
is not only about 
data/information 
protection, but 
includes all ‘things’ 
such as cars, traffic 
lights, IoT appliances.
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 1.3. Can cybersecurity be measured?
While organisations invest a lot of money  
and human capital in enforcing and strengthening 
their cybersecurity, there is still no globally 
accepted and standardised way of measuring it. 
According to a 2019 Court of Auditors’ report,  
this makes it difficult to decide which investments 
have resulted in a safer organisation. Although 
sporadic efforts have been made, including the 
Potomac Institute’s Cyber Readiness Index 2.0  
(The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2016), 
there is no explicit system that can be used to 
quantify cybersecurity objectively. Organisations 
typically use qualitative measures of security 
rather than quantitative ones. In fact, according 
to a recent survey (Moore, Dynes and Chang, 
2016) involving chief information security officers, 
industry best practices and frameworks were 
deemed to be the most important factors to 
access an organisation’s cybersecurity position, 
while quantitative methods measuring the 
effectiveness of security controls were placed 
much lower down the list. 
In response, the R Street Institute launched 
an initiative which resulted in a partially annotated 
bibliography entitled ‘Resources for measuring 
cybersecurity’ (Waldron, 2019). The authors indicate 
that a system of metrics is required which decision-
makers can use and which need to be agreed  
and accepted within the relevant communities. 
Their key findings are summarised as follows:  
• Some measurement methodologies try to 
assess how changes in security measures will 
affect an organisation using forecasts rather 
than actual results, while others are basically 
reactive checking the effectiveness in terms of 
positive increase or harm done after a security 
measure has been implemented and deployed. 
• A number of methodologies assess security 
by relying on frameworks and checklists of 
factors believed to strengthen security and by 
measuring compliance rates with a baseline 
set of best practices. 
• A third set of methodologies focuses on 
resiliency rather than prevention, i.e. how 
quickly a system is restored after an attack.
   Cybersecurity 
is as a large, 
multifaceted 
discipline rather 
than a sub-area 
of computer 
science. For that 
reason, there is still no 
globally accepted way 
of measuring it.
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SUMMARY
The rise in new disruptive digital technologies and their integration in our lives is 
generating and driving a profound transformation. In a new world where physical 
and digital blend together, the traditional measures to guarantee trust are no longer 
sufficient as they rely mainly on a societal model which has the material world as 
its centre of balance. Cybersecurity is an essential societal need, reinforcing the idea 
of a ‘digital society secure by design’. It is also a value in which privacy, trust and 
data protection must converge in the building of trust. This chapter gathers together 
research from different sources and disciplinary fields, providing multidimensional 
insights into the evolution of cybersecurity from the advent of the digital era to the 
present day, and looking forward to the future needs of our society.
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CYBERSECURITY 
AT THE HEART 
OF SOCIETAL 
TRANSFORMATION
What is new in the ongoing digital transformation 
is the speed and scale of its evolution, making  
it the first technological and societal revolution  
to affect almost all of mankind simultaneously. 
Our digital world is now much more complex  
and cumbersome to understand and therefore 
harder to protect as a whole. Cybersecurity is thus 
an essential element of our society.
The main factor that characterises this digital 
transformation is a novel technological paradigm 
of datafication and thingification: everything 
becomes a ‘connected thing’ able to produce data 
(Figure 2). 
These developments are directly connected to  
the ongoing explosion of connected humans  
and devices, where many of the latter are 
deployed in an ‘install-and-forget’ manner. 
A direct consequence of this tight intertwining 
between things, humans, AI and data is that  
the more our world goes digital, the more  
its attack surface increases and the bigger  
the potential impact of cyber attacks on  
our society.
This would be sufficient already to highlight  
the centrality of cybersecurity in the technological 
evolution of digitalisation. Yet, there are more 
profound reasons why cybersecurity must be 
considered as a cornerstone of society today.
Cybersecurity  
is becoming  
an essential element 
of the new digitally 
driven society.
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Figure 2: Simplified view of the datafication/ 
thingification paradigm processes
Traditionally, societal priorities have centred on  
the security and well-being of citizens and  
the stability of the economy, achieved through 
policy initiatives, industrial standardisation, 
certification processes, law enforcement and 
civic education. This ‘magic square of enablers’ 
is essential to ensure citizens’ trust in governing 
institutions and the society in which they live.
Traditional measures to guarantee trust are  
no longer sufficient. In this context, cybersecurity 
becomes our digital anchor, enabling trust within 
society to be re-established and guaranteed. 
Cybersecurity should thus be considered as  
an essential societal need reinforcing the idea  
of a ‘digital society secure by design’. 
The rapid exploitation by cyber attackers on  
the COVID-19 pandemic to attack systems  
and individuals reinforces this need.
 2.1. Cybersecurity in the context of  
 privacy, data protection and trust
If we think of digitalisation, immediately we think  
of ‘online services’, e-commerce, IoT, smart 
devices, etc. Their common denominator is  
the establishment of a minimum level of trust 
in the operations performed, in privacy and in 
data protection. Cybersecurity is the enforcer of 
these three dimensions, ensuring that trust is not 
misattributed, that digital processes maintain  
their integrity and availability, and that privacy 
and data protection are well preserved.  
 2.1.1 Privacy and cybersecurity
European citizens have the fundamental right 
to respect for their private life, home and 
communications10.  
The rise of AI and big data analytics pose 
new privacy challenges with implications for 
cybersecurity. For example, new techniques can  
be used to re-identify anonymised data by 
inferring from multiple and large databases. 
Hence, there is an urgent need to rethink the way 
in which online services are designed, putting 
privacy and cybersecurity at the core of the design 
process from the outset.
 
Improving the level of transparency and usability 
of online services would facilitate this process. 
Transparency is about informing users on how 
their data is handled by digital services, including 
processing, storage and distribution to other 
parties. Only by understanding these data-
handling aspects are users able to evaluate 
the privacy and cybersecurity risks. Therefore, 
cybersecurity is also a matter of awareness-
raising and information. 
Another important factor is the abundance of 
powerful anonymisation tools, including Tor, I2P, 
Freenet, Retroshare, and GNUnet. While they 
make a major contribution to the fight against 
censorship, the right to freedom of expression, 
and protection of the individual's privacy and 
anonymity, they constitute powerful attack vectors 
in the hand of aggressors wishing to conceal illicit 
activities and minimise their attack footprint.  
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   Digital 
technologies  
have become  
the foundation  
of all modern 
innovative economic 
and social systems.
 2.1.2 Data protection and cybersecurity 
In the EU, data protection is enshrined in Article 8 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (European 
Union, 2012). In addition, the GDPR (European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 
2016b), which entered into force in 2018,  
puts forward a set of rules designed to ensure  
the protection of citizens’ personal data  
and strengthen their fundamental rights. 
 
The GDPR acknowledges the importance of 
cybersecurity to protect personal data as  
a prerequisite for the collection and processing 
of personal data11. Experience shows that 
cybersecurity incidents due to the lack or ineffective 
implementation of proper cybersecurity mechanisms 
can lead to massive personal data breaches, 
affecting hundreds of millions of individuals and 
harming the reputation of the organisations involved.
Cyber attackers have started to recognise  
the value that the personal data of potential 
victims holds for them. Personal data breaches 
containing user passwords are regularly abused 
to conduct cyber attacks, namely impersonating 
users, bypassing authentication mechanisms, etc.
The GDPR introduces the principles of data 
protection by design and by default; the by  
design principle refers to the need to consider  
data protection requirements starting from  
the inception and design phases of a product  
or service, while the by default principle refers to 
the fact that even without explicit configuration  
by users, the product or service ensures  
a minimum level of data protection. Both 
principles are in line with the security by design 
and by default principles well established  
and adopted by the cybersecurity community. 
Only effective integration and close cooperation 
between data protection and cybersecurity can 
ensure that personal data will be well protected 
and will not be misused and that citizens will 
ultimately be in control of their personal data.
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 2.1.3 Trust and cybersecurity 
In today’s hyperconnected digital world, trust  
is a necessary requirement to ensure stability  
and growth in the digital economy and foster digital 
transformation. In this context, cybersecurity and 
data protection are key enablers to delivering trust. 
In the context of digital transformation, determining  
without doubt the identity of other interactors and 
getting a guarantee of the correctness and integrity 
of their actions are part of the process to correctly 
evaluate the level of trust/risk of a digital service. 
However, trust should not be considered only in  
the context of digital interactions: if trust in digital  
is missing, the roll-out of big digital infrastructures, 
from energy smart grids to intelligent transport 
systems, e-government services, etc. would 
never take off. Obviously, there are also societal 
implications in this equation as trust is at  
the foundation of a secure society. Given  
the importance of trust, any element that 
strengthens its position is even more crucial.
Businesses, governments and citizens are 
becoming increasingly concerned by the potential 
impacts of cyber threats, such as massive 
personal data breaches, ransomware attacks, 
cyber extortion campaigns, cyber espionage 
or state-sponsored cyber attacks. As a result, 
users of digital products and services inevitably 
measure the benefits they can obtain against  
the potential cybersecurity and data protection 
threats they might have to face. The trade-off 
is obviously subjective and is linked to personal 
experience, interests, culture and age, among 
other factors. Thus, trust in digital services  
and products becomes intrinsically linked to  
the perception that individuals and organisations 
have of their reliability, security and safety.
Ensuring digital services work safely and securely, 
while guaranteeing citizens’ privacy and data 
protection, illustrates that cybersecurity has evolved 
from a technological ‘option’ to a societal need. 
 2.2. The economics of cybersecurity
In most industries, market forces generate 
important incentives for companies to improve 
their products and services. However, the 
absence of effective competition in the digital 
sector means users can exert minimal influence 
on vendors to provide solutions to revealed 
vulnerabilities, resulting in the delayed release  
of solutions or poor-quality solutions (Jo, 2017). 
When users have either the possibility or 
willingness to switch to competing products  
as a response to the emergence of vulnerabilities, 
vendors may face stronger incentives to create 
more-secure products. However, consumers often 
face high switching costs – i.e. they are not very 
likely to switch to a different provider in the case 
of known security weaknesses either concerning 
the software they use or in the software used by 
the vendors of the products and services they buy 
(Ablon et al., 2016).  
Research has shown that firms’ stock prices 
are negatively affected by announcements of 
cybersecurity breaches, although this effect only 
seems to apply in the short term (Kannan, Rees 
and Sridhar, 2007). In other words in the long run 
investors do not seem to care about reputational 
damage from cyber attacks. An important point 
here is that while small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) are the foundation of the EU 
economy (Hope et al., 2017), they are also more 
vulnerable to cyber attacks. Such vulnerabilities, 
which include a lack of formal cybersecurity 
policies, skills and expertise, shortage of financial 
resources, and incorrect attitudes towards risk 
management and cybersecurity, negatively 
influence their resilience to security threats. 
Furthermore, incentives for different agents may 
not be aligned. For example, hospital managers 
and/or labs require medical records to improve 
service provision, financial management and 
possibly also research but these interests are not 
necessarily aligned with the patients’ desire for 
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privacy. Misaligned incentives across network/
service providers and other related parties 
also exist. For instance, while ingress packet 
filtering (BCP 38) was ratified almost 20 years 
ago, it has failed to solve the issue of source IP 
address spoofing due to fundamental incentive 
misalignment. Currently, a network provider  
which pays to adopt BCP 38 receives no direct 
benefit as any benefit goes to other networks 
and not the network provider itself. A more viable 
solution needs to provide value to the party 
investing in the solution rather than someone  
up- or downstream. 
The design of information systems is characterised 
by an efficiency-resilience trade-off. Network 
convergence has allowed for the joint provision 
of several communication services by a single 
company. This represents enormous efficiencies 
as different applications can run on a common 
infrastructure. Business continuity now depends 
critically on the continued operation of the internet, 
and one single failure may have important spillover 
effects in many sectors. However, an individual 
company decision to improve efficiency by reducing 
operating costs does not take into account 
the implied increase in long-term/cascading 
vulnerabilities. Once again, incentives for short-
term efficiency gains are not well aligned with 
incentives for reducing long-term vulnerability. 
Several benefits can accrue from sharing 
cybersecurity information (Gal-Or and Ghose, 
2005). However, the current industry context 
does not provide sufficient economic arguments 
to support cooperation and to justify the required 
investments for greater coordination. While public 
initiatives may create mechanisms enabling 
better access to information, effective voluntary 
initiatives among relevant stakeholders would also 
significantly improve coordination efforts.  
Information asymmetries arise due to strong 
incentives to under-report incidents. When such 
asymmetries exist, society may fail to invest in 
appropriate defences. Poorly informed agents 
(consumers and firms) unable to accurately 
understand real threats and vulnerabilities will be 
inclined to rely on poor cybersecurity solutions. 
On the other hand, security providers will not be 
incentivised to bring better technologies to the 
market to help users protect themselves against 
the more serious threats. 
On a positive note, bug bounty programs organised 
by numerous organisations and companies allow 
vulnerabilities to be detected and resolved before 
they are exploited by threat actors. This proactive 
practice can be further encouraged and fostered by 
governments by providing tax-relief programmes 
or other incentives to participating organisations. 
One important characteristic of the information 
technology industry is the existence of different 
types of externalities, i.e. situations where 
individuals’ actions have side effects on others.  
The three most relevant are network externalities, 
externalities of insecurity, and interdependent 
security. The software industry is highly 
concentrated, mainly due to the benefits of 
interoperability. This feature is also known as 
network externalities: the larger the network,  
the greater the value to each of its members 
(Duch-Brown, 2017). 
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   The pace of 
innovation is 
surging and killer 
applications  
are emerging much 
more frequently  
than in the past.
The choice of an operating system is determined 
not only on quality and price but also on  
the number of other users who have adopted it.  
This helps to explain one of the basic weaknesses  
of security: as platforms exploit network 
externalities to build their privileged market 
position, they must attract suppliers of 
complementary products as well as direct  
users/customers. Given that it is more difficult to 
develop applications for more-secure software or 
systems, security is not considered properly until 
dominance has been achieved and sometimes  
not even then.  
By definition, the lack of cybersecurity creates 
negative externalities: a compromised computer 
can harm more computers and/or systems than 
the host itself. In these cases, the societal costs 
derived from cyber attacks are greater than  
the financial loss to an individual or a company  
in monetary terms. 
Interdependent security is another type of 
externality related to cybersecurity. Security 
investment by an individual creates positive 
externalities for others who may no longer have 
incentives to pursue their own investments 
(Kunreuther and Heal, 2003). The result of this 
process is free riding: agents will not bother to 
invest in security when they know that other 
players will not invest, leaving them vulnerable  
in any case (Varian, 2004). 
This also impacts on another aspect of the 
cybersecurity economy: the difficulties faced by the 
few European cybersecurity suppliers (typically SMEs 
operating in niche cybersecurity market segments)  
in a global market dominated by non-EU suppliers. 
Improving the competitiveness of Europe’s 
cybersecurity industry is indeed paramount to 
ensure the security of critical digital assets  
and, in general, to improve European autonomy  
in the digital world. A key role will be played  
in this area by the Horizon Europe and Digital 
Europe funding programmes. 
 2.3. The cybersecurity policy landscape
Cybersecurity goes hand in hand with  
the development of technology and the ensuing  
digital transformation of society. Today, 
digitisation, digital identity, privacy, data protection 
and, crucially, shifting challenges in the safety 
and security of our societies are all of major 
importance in policymaking, and all connect  
to cybersecurity. 
Arguably, the most significant actors in  
the cybersecurity arena are the states per se.  
That is, everything starts with a country’s short- 
or mid-term strategic vision and plan and related 
actions to achieve it12. With this in mind, a basic 
priority for governments should be the shaping 
of a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy – 
accompanied by the appropriate resources to fund 
initiatives – that stipulates a competent authority 
in charge of the country’s national cybersecurity 
position. For instance, some Member States have 
as strategic goal to increase the share of gross 
domestic product due to the digital economy, 
acknowledging that their future development 
and growth relies on their capacity to safeguard 
their digital economy. This requires investing 
appropriately and undertaking structural reforms.
Given that the digital transformation knows no 
borders, cybersecurity has become internationalised. 
Challenges facing the international community 
include future international collaboration on 
cybersecurity regulations, standardisation, cross-
border prosecution of cybercrime and international 
law, and how to react to an increasing theatre of 
hybrid threats.
The following subsections outline the most 
significant efforts to date by countries, unions  
of states, academia, agencies for cybersecurity,  
and think-tanks to mould and develop  
cybersecurity and strategic risk management  
plans and frameworks.
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 2.3.1 The EU landscape
In February 2020, the Commission issued  
its ideas and actions for a digital transformation  
that works for all, reflecting the best of Europe:  
open, fair, diverse, democratic and confident.  
It proposes a European society powered by  
digital solutions that put people first, opens up 
new opportunities for businesses, and boosts  
the development of trustworthy technology  
to foster an open and democratic society  
and a vibrant and sustainable economy.  
Three strategic documents were issued, namely: 
• a Communication on Shaping Europe’s  
digital future (European Commission,  
2020c), which sees cybersecurity as  
a principal ingredient in a successful digital 
transformation where European citizens  
and businesses trust that their applications 
and products are secure;  
 
• a White Paper on Artificial Intelligence 
(European Commission, 2020b); 
• a European Strategy for Data (European 
Commission, 2020a). 
Cybersecurity is a transversal dimension 
underpinning this Commission’s priority to  
build ‘a Europe fit for a digital age’. 
Over the last decade, the EU has addressed a wide 
range of cybersecurity measures, further details 
of which are provided in Table 1. Since 2016, in 
particular, the emphasis on cybersecurity has 
increased significantly with the adoption of the 
NIS Directive which pushes industry and relevant 
players to reduce vulnerabilities and to strengthen 
resilience. This has been complemented by the 
signature between the EU and the European Cyber 
Security Organisation (ECSO) of a public-private 
partnership to support all types of projects and 
initiatives to develop cybersecurity within the EU. 
 
Date EU initiative Reference
19/02/2020 Shaping Europe’s Digital Future
White Paper on Artificial Intelligence
A European Data Strategy (European Commission, 2020a)
COM(2020) 65 final
COM(2020) 66 final
26/03/2019 Cybersecurity of 5G Networks (European Commission, 2019) C(2019) 2335 final
12/09/2018 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council establishing the European Cybersecurity 
Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre  
and the Network of National Coordination Centres (European 
Commission, 2018c)
COM(2018) 630 final
13/06/2018 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council – Increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to 
address hybrid threats (European Commission, 2018b)
JOIN/2018/16 final
13/09/2017 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council – Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong 
cybersecurity for the EU (European Commission, 2017b)
JOIN/2017/0450 final
Table 1: Summary of EU initiatives relevant to cybersecurity
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Date EU initiative Reference
13/09/2017 European Commission, Regulation of the European Parliament  
and of the Council on ENISA, the ‘EU Cybersecurity Agency’,  
and repealing Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on Information  
and Communication Technology cybersecurity certification  
(‘Cybersecurity Act’) (European Commission, 2017d)
COM(2017) 477 final
13/09/2017 ‘Commission Recommendation 2017/1584 on coordinated 
response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises’  
(European Commission, 2017a)
C/2017/6100
07/06/2017 Draft Council Conclusions on a Framework for a Joint EU  
Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities (‘Cyber  
Diplomacy Toolbox’) – Adoption 
9916/17
March 2017 Report of the High-Level Advisory 
Group of the EC Scientific Advisory Mechanism Cybersecurity  
in the European digital single market. 2017 (European  
Commission and Directorate-General for Research  
and Innovation, 2017)
06/07/2016 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament  
and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for  
a high common level of security of network and information 
systems across the Union (European Parliament and Council  
of the European Union, 2016a) 
EU Directive 
2016/1148
15/07/2016 European Cyber Security Organisation (ECSO), ‘Cyber Security 
contractual Public-Private Partnership,’ ECSO – European Cyber 
Security Organisation (ECSO, 2019)
27/04/2016 European Parliament and Council of the European Union,  
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament  
and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of  
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal  
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)
Regulation 
(EU)2016/679
06/04/2016 ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council - Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats  
a European Union response’ (European Commission, 2016b)
JOIN(2016) 18
28/04/2015 Communication from the Commission to the European  
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – The European 
Agenda on Security (European Commission, 2015)
COM/2015/0185
07/02/2013 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the  
Committee of the Regions on Cybersecurity Strategy of  
the European Union: ‘An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace’ 
(European Parliament et al., 2013)
JOIN/2013/01
The 2017 Joint Communication on Cybersecurity 
(European Commission, 2017b) represents the 
most comprehensive piece of EU policymaking 
regarding cybersecurity, grouping measures into 
three pillars of European cybersecurity policy: 
resilience, deterrence and defence.
The ‘Cybersecurity Act’ (European Commission, 
2017d) focuses on the definition of cybersecurity 
certification processes and standards for ICT 
products and gives a permanent mandate to ENISA, 
the EU Agency for Cybersecurity. As far as hybrid 
(cyber) threats are concerned, there have been Joint 
Communications to the European Parliament and 
the Council entitled ‘Joint Framework on countering 
hybrid threats’ (European Commission, 2016b) in 
April 2016, and ‘Increasing resilience and bolstering 
capabilities to address hybrid threats’ in June 2018 
(European Commission, 2018b). 
Likewise, the ‘Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox’ will 
provide the means for coordinating a response  
by EU Member States to malicious cyber activities 
at the EU level. Other complementary measures 
include the ‘blueprint’, a recommendation on 
addressing severe, large-scale cybersecurity 
incidents, the creation of a European Cybersecurity 
Competence Centre to coordinate a network of 
cybersecurity competence centres, and specific 
guidance on how to address cybersecurity 
measures in 5G networks. 
At every stage, the development of a European 
cybersecurity policy is strongly guided by  
the special character of the EU whereby it has  
to provide a common link between Member  
States’ national security agendas while guided  
by European core values and fundamental rights.
 2.3.2 Academia, agencies for  
 cybersecurity, and think-tanks
Academia, think-tanks, and relevant communities 
have also started compiling methodologies to 
assist countries and organisations in their cyber 
preparedness. The Potomac Institute’s Cyber 
Readiness Index 2.0 (CRI) offers an experience-
based methodological framework for assessing 
a country’s cyber readiness. In addition, the 
Oxford Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model 
(CMM) sketches different levels of countries’ 
cybersecurity maturity based on five pillars:  
(a) cybersecurity policy and strategy; (b) cyber 
culture and society; (c) cybersecurity, education, 
training and skills; (d) legal and regulatory 
frameworks; and (e) standards, organisations  
and technologies, and can be used toward 
diagnosing cyber preparedness. The e-Governance 
Academy in Estonia developed a multi-region 
National Cyber Security Index (NCSI) (Estonia’s 
e-Governance Academy, 2019) which measures 
countries’ readiness level on cybersecurity,  
and tracks down the major priorities that need 
to be addressed per country to prevent and fight 
against cyber attacks and crimes.
 
ENISA has published a report on risk assessment  
on cloud-computing business models  
and technologies, entitled ‘Benefits, risks  
and recommendations for information security’  
(ENISA, 2009) in the context of the Emerging 
and Future Risk Framework project. Several 
other reports, also published in 2019, are worth 
mentioning. ‘Good practices in innovation on 
cybersecurity under the National Cyber Security 
Strategies (NCSS)’ addresses three aspects of 
innovation (ENISA, 2019f). ‘Threat Landscape 
for 5G networks’ focuses on the pertinent issue 
of 5G roll-out, and includes a threat taxonomy 
map and inter-relating risk scenarios to cyber 
threats (ENISA, 2019b). Further reports include 
‘EU Member States incident response development 
status report’ (ENISA, 2019d), the ‘ENISA good 
practices for security of Smart Cars’ (ENISA, 
2019a), ‘Port Cybersecurity – Good practices for 
cybersecurity in the maritime sector’ (ENISA, 
2019g), and ‘Good Practices for Security of IoT – 
Secure Software Development Life Cycle’ (ENISA, 
2019e). Finally, ENISA maintains an interactive 
map containing the NCSS per EU Member State 
along with their guidelines on implementation  
and information sharing (ENISA, 2020b). 
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In 2013, Europol set up the European Cybercrime 
Centre (EC3) to strengthen the law enforcement 
response to cybercrime in the EU and thus to 
help protect European citizens, businesses and 
governments from online crime. EC3 has been 
involved in tens of high-profile operations and 
hundreds of on-the-spot operational-support 
deployments resulting in hundreds of arrests,  
and has analysed hundreds of thousands of 
files, the vast majority of which have proven  
to be malicious.  
Each year, EC3 publishes the Internet Organised 
Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA), its flagship 
strategic report on key findings and emerging 
threats and developments in cybercrime.  
The IOCTA demonstrates the wide and varied 
nature of cybercrime.
 2.3.3 The international landscape 
This section covers approaches to cybersecurity  
in the United States (US), China, Russia, Australia 
and relevant international organisations.  
In particular, since 2017, a number of regulations 
have been passed. 
The US 2018 National Cyber Strategy (US 
Government, 2018) adopts a more assertive 
position compared to its 2015 predecessor, 
reflecting the growth in cyber threats. These 
include the Russian campaign against the 2016 
US election, the proliferation of ransomware 
attacks on critical infrastructure, and the mass 
exploitation of US intellectual property. It is closely 
aligned with the US Department of Defense (DoD) 
2018 Cyber Strategy (US Department of Defense, 
2018) which marks out the military’s role in 
relation to cyberspace and also adopts a much 
more aggressive stance. One of the key concepts 
within this strategy is that of ‘defending forward’ 
with the mission to ‘disrupt or halt malicious cyber 
activity at its source, including activity that falls 
below the level of armed conflict’. 
Since 2014, the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) has published a number 
of guidance documents related to cybersecurity 
(Matthew P. Barrett, 2018). In 2018, NIST updated 
its special publication on ‘Risk Management 
Framework for Information Systems and 
Organizations: A System Life Cycle Approach for 
Security and Privacy’ (Ronald S. Ross, 2018). This 
voluntary framework includes standards, guidelines 
and best practices to manage cybersecurity risk.  
China, on the other hand, has followed a similar 
approach to the EU by embedding elements  
of the NIS Directive into its 2017 national 
cybersecurity law (Asiapedia, 2019). This law 
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makes explicit the responsibilities of relevant 
government agencies, internet service providers, 
and end-users. Relevant organisations, which 
include any network or service provider and, in 
particular, any critical information infrastructure 
operator that would endanger national security  
if compromised, must establish stringent technical 
or other necessary measures. For example, these 
may include establishing a specialised security 
management body, carrying out disaster recovery 
back-ups, etc. to ensure the internet is safe  
and available, dealing with cybersecurity incidents 
adequately, deterring and preventing cyber criminal 
activities, and preserving the integrity, secrecy  
and usability of internet data. 
In 2017, Russia adopted Federal law No. 187-FZ 
addressing the security of critical information 
infrastructures. Under this law, facilities must 
enforce sufficient protection measures and register 
with the Federal Service for Technical and Export 
Control (FSTEK). To cope with the risks related to 
the illicit use and potential abuse of information 
systems, any software produced abroad, especially 
that related to ICT security, like firewalls, antivirus 
applications, or any software using encryption,  
is subject to review by certified Russian agencies. 
This means that before a piece of software is 
imported and sold in Russia, its source code  
may be examined to ensure it is backdoor-free.  
 
In addition, the 2019 Federal law No. 90-FZ 
provides the basis for isolating the Russian 
segment of the internet from the rest of the WWW 
– allegedly with the use of a parallel ‘national 
DNS infrastructure’ – therefore the so-called 
‘Runet’ will still remain operational in the advent 
of a foreign cyber attack. As regards this latter 
point, the debate about ‘sovereignty in cyberspace’ 
is ongoing and at its core is the problem of 
misalignment. A key question arises here in relation 
to whether sovereignty in cyberspace can exist hand 
in hand with globalised connectivity, and whether 
national borders in cyberspace will eventually lower 
risks and strengthen security and order.
 
In 2020, the Australian Cyber Security Centre 
published the ‘Australian Government Information 
Security Manual’ (Australian Cyber Security 
Centre, 2020). It provides strategic guidance and 
a cybersecurity framework ‘that organisations can 
apply, using their risk management framework, to 
protect their information and systems from cyber 
threats’. It offers cybersecurity principles grouped 
into key activities, namely: govern, protect, detect 
and respond. In addition, the Australian Government 
has developed a ‘Protective Security Policy 
Framework’ (Australian Government, 2020) with 
the aim of helping ‘entities to protect their people, 
information and assets, at home and overseas’.  
As regards international measures, these 
have come mainly from the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the World 
Economic Forum (WEF). The ITU has developed 
the National Cybersecurity Guide and a Global 
Cybersecurity Index to help countries to evaluate 
their cybersecurity strategies and programmes 
against those implemented by other countries. 
In the same context, in 2018, the WEF published 
its Cyber Resilience Playbook for Public-Private 
Collaboration (WEF, 2018). Its goal is to steer 
public-private collaboration in cybersecurity policy 
development. It also highlights the need for a clear 
national cyber governance framework, including 
unambiguous roles and responsibilities.
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SUMMARY
Research activities represent a solid indicator of the growth and maturity of a given 
field. In this chapter, we analyse EU cybersecurity research-related activities and com-
pare them with other countries on a global scale. We examine publications, patents, 
and the collaboration between public and private organisations in order to compile 
our observations, whilst also looking into more specific cybersecurity domains. From 
the results, it appears that even if the EU is one of the strong players in cybersecu-
rity research, when looking at the national level, the more influential institutions are 
concentrated in only a few Member States. In order to further improve the situation 
in the EU, greater collaboration and cooperation are needed at both the national and 
international level.
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EUROPEAN 
RESEARCH IN 
CYBERSECURITY
Research and development are primary indicators 
of the liveliness and competitiveness of a sector 
and its capacity to stay abreast of a given field. 
This chapter gives an indication of the cybersecurity 
research landscape across the EU and draws  
on a large mapping exercise conducted by  
the JRC. Results from participation in H2020 
projects, scientific publications and patents are 
also described.
 3.1. Mapping the cybersecurity  
 research landscape
As seen above, the Commission intends to create 
a network of cybersecurity competence centres 
across the EU to stimulate the development  
and deployment of technology in cybersecurity.  
In support of this initiative, the JRC undertook  
a comprehensive exercise to plot existing European 
centres, typically university departments or 
research centres. The data collected provides  
a screenshot of the landscape, which is described 
in more detail below and will be covered more 
fully in the forthcoming publication of a dedicated 
‘Cybersecurity Atlas’. Some 725 organisations 
participated in this exercise, a summary of  
which is provided below. The mapping covers all 
the EU Member States plus additional countries 
participating in the Horizon 2020 research 
programme (H2020), as seen in Figure 3. 
Figure 4, which summarises the clustering per 
country, shows that the majority of research 
activities are mainly performed by higher 
education organisations (universities). Figure 5 
shows the distribution per country and per type  
of ‘legal status’ of the research institutions  
(public, private or public-private partnerships).  
It is interesting to note that, with a few exceptions, 
there is a certain balance between public  
and private organisations. Furthermore, despite 
being a relatively new instrument, public-private 
partnerships on cybersecurity research exist in  
the majority of European countries.
Although  
cybersecurity  
research in the EU  
is both robust  
and dynamic,  
there is room for  
better collaboration 
and coordination.
343. European research in cybersecurity
Figure 3: Mapping coverage
Figure 4: Clustering per type of institution
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 3.2 Cybersecurity research  
 domain mapping 
 
While all research domains are covered, a deeper 
analysis shows that there are several sub-domains, 
such as post-quantum cryptography, which are 
poorly investigated. Similarly, the initial data  
show that 50 institutions claim to cover all 
cybersecurity domains, with 200 claiming to  
cover at least 75 % of the domains. While this  
appears positive in terms of geographical 
coverage, further analysis of the scientific 
literature and participation levels in H2020 
cybersecurity-related projects reveals that a few 
research institutions dominate the field. The most 
plausible reasons for this are the dispersion of 
resources and the lack of overall coordination  
and collaboration.  
3. European research in cybersecurity
Figure 5: Legal status
Theoretical Foundations of Security Analysis and Design
Trust Management; Assurance; and Accountability
Operational Incident Handling and Digital Forensics
Human Aspects
Assurance; Audit; and Certification
Cryptology
Technology and Legal Aspects
Security Measurements
Identity and Access Management (IAM)
Security Management and Governance
So ware and Hardware Security Engineering
Network and Distributed Systems
Data Security and Privacy
Education and Training
500 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600
272
281
295
308
310
320
321
334
369
444
457
474
551
556
Figure 6: Domain coverage
DE FR ES IT GB NL BE AT GR SE CH PT PL SK BG FI NO IE DK SI CY LU LT HU LV IL EE RO CZ TR HR AM MT XK MK AU
N
um
be
r 
of
 a
ns
w
er
s
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Private
Partnership
Association
Informal group
Non-governmental organisations (NGO)
Public
Limited liability partnership (LLP)
Other
Military
Legal entity under public law
Non-profit organisation (NPO)
Constituent entity (no separate legal status)
Public-private partnership
36
DE FR ES
GB
IT
BE
NL
AT
G
R
CH
SE
PL
PT
FI
IE
BG
NODKSIRO
IL
SK
LU
EE
HU
LV
LT
CZ
CY
HR
TR
AM
AU
MT
XK MK
Distribution of Cybersecurity Domains
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Human Aspects
Education and Training
Trust Management; Assurance; 
and Accountability
Security Measurements
Assurance; Audit; and Certification
Technology and Legal Aspects
Identity and Access Management (IAM)
Cryptology
Network and Distributed Systems
Theoretical Foundations of Security 
Analysis and Design
Soware and Hardware Security Engineering
Data Security and Privacy
Security Management and Governance
Operational Incident Handling 
and Digital Forensics
3. European research in cybersecurity
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Analysis of the sectors covered by the research 
centres further validates this reasoning. It is evident, 
for example, that the sectors and applications 
where costly facilities are needed to perform 
cybersecurity research, in fields such as energy, 
space and defence, are well covered only by those 
countries which traditionally have more resources 
available to invest in big facilities or where there is 
a strong industrial player in the specific sector.
This is confirmed by analysing the field of 
applications (Figure 10) where those that require 
more investment, such as high-performance 
computing, AI and quantum, are well covered only 
in those countries which traditionally can afford to 
invest in such areas.
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 3.3  Scientific and technological  
 development analysis
 
The number of publications, participation in 
H2020 projects and analysis of patents also help 
to build a picture of scientific and technological 
development in this domain. 
 3.3.1 Analysis of publications
Analysis of the cybersecurity scientific literature 
indicates that the USA leads scientific research in 
cybersecurity with half the number of publications. 
The EU is in second place with a quarter of the 
total number of publications, while the remaining 
quarter aggregates the scientific production of  
all the remaining non-EU countries (dominated by 
China, Canada and Japan), as shown in Figure 11. 
 
The majority of publications are concentrated  
in the following domains:
• Security management, 
• Network security, 
• Data security and privacy, 
• Cryptology.
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Figure 10: Fields of application
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It is interesting to note that these domains  
match the domain ranking which emerged from 
the analysis of the surveys.
As regards this analysis, it is important to 
underline how the preliminary analysis was 
quantitative, i.e. the relevance of a publication 
was not weighted (a publication for a conference 
was counted as a publication in an international 
journal). Moreover, even if the four domains 
mentioned above dominate the others in 
terms of scientific production, the results are 
underdeveloped in several of their sub-domains. 
One example is in the field of cryptology which 
ranks fourth in terms of the total number of 
papers published but where there is limited 
publication in the post-quantum sub-domain.  
This is also confirmed by the results of  
the mapping.  
An analysis of the collaboration networks  
(see Figure 12) shows how the USA is  
the EU’s strongest partner as regards its overall 
scientific production in cybersecurity, followed  
by Switzerland and Israel. 
Distribution of the scientific production among 
European institutions reveals an anomaly with 
respect to the survey results. While more than  
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Figure 11: Scientific publications in cybersecurity per country
   The USA  
is the EU’s 
strongest partner 
regarding the overall 
scientific production  
in cybersecurity, 
followed by 
Switzerland  
and Israel.
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200 institutions claim to cover at least three 
quarters of the cybersecurity research domains, 
an analysis of the scientific literature by domain 
shows that each domain is dominated by a limited 
number of institutions in terms of the number of 
publications. Furthermore, the numerical difference 
between the top 10 in each domain and the rest 
of the institutions publishing in that domain is not 
negligible. In other words, the picture obtained 
from the analysis of scientific publications 
combined with the results provided by the survey 
shows a Europe where scientific production is 
polarised in a few institutions which are able to 
make a difference in the domain. 
3. European research in cybersecurity
Figure 12: Size of node = country share of scientific publications in cybersecurity (size of nodes = number of 
projects, edge between nodes = project(s) in common, colours identify communities of countries collaborating 
more often)
    In Europe,  
a few institutions 
polarise scientific 
production and  
can aggregate critical 
mass, enabling them  
to be influential  
in the domain.
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 3.3.2 Horizon 2020 projects 
 
This picture of a polarised Europe is confirmed 
to some extent by analysing the participation 
in cybersecurity H2020 projects, where this 
polarisation around a limited number of academic 
institutions is even more evident (Figure 13).
It is worth noting that when considering  
the participation of private companies in H2020 
cybersecurity-related projects, the weight of  
the different countries is quite similar.
On a qualitative note, a number of pilot research 
projects funded through H2020, including 
CONCORDIA, ECHO, SPARTA and CyberSec4Europe, 
are intended to advance and boost the EU’s 
cybersecurity capacity and address forthcoming 
challenges towards a safer European digital single 
market. Last but not least, some other H2020-
funded projects, such as EUNITY which focuses on 
improving the cybersecurity and privacy dialogue 
between Europe and Japan, are aimed at fuelling 
and ultimately developing the dialogue between 
Europe and third countries on cybersecurity  
and privacy research.
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 3.3.3 Patent analysis 
Figure 14 gives a picture of patents in  
the cybersecurity sector where patent filing is 
dominated by China, followed by the USA, while 
the EU does not have a prominent position.
 
A more-detailed analysis shows that, on average, 
the number of patents filed by a European entity 
on cybersecurity is around 5 %, with the exception 
of cryptology (21 %).
As regards the ratio between scientific  
publications and patents, it seems evident that 
the relatively high scientific production does 
not automatically correspond with to an equal 
‘innovation’ push. Several reasons might explain 
this phenomenon:
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• Patent filing is a costly and complex process. 
• Collaboration between industry and academia 
is limited, or ‘consultancy oriented’ (i.e. one-
shot collaborations without a multi-annual 
collaboration and development plan). 
• The patent analysis is unable to completely 
capture the innovation chain. 
The last point is certainly true for ICT and 
cybersecurity as patent analysis does not allow 
the capture, for example, of the phenomenon  
of software development and licensing for which, 
unfortunately, it is not easy to provide a projection. 
However, even considering the fact that a relevant 
element of the picture is missing, it is still true that 
other countries patent much more in cybersecurity 
than Europe.
 3.4  European cybersecurity  
 research ecosystem
The analyses of the mapping results and the 
desktop research provide a complex picture of  
the situation of cybersecurity research in Europe.
Along with the USA, the EU is one of the two main 
actors in cybersecurity scientific production.  
While there is complete coverage of the research 
domains at EU level, it is noticeable that scientific 
results in some relevant sub-domains are limited.  
At country level, all Member States have 
cybersecurity capabilities covering the majority 
of research domains. However, their capacity 
to impact on the scientific and technological 
production is heterogeneous, with the more-
influential institutions concentrated in a few 
Member States. The same trend is confirmed when 
looking at the sectors and fields of application 
covered, with those requiring the availability of 
costly facilities only explored in-depth by a limited 
number of institutions in a few countries.  
 
As regards the collaboration between industry  
and academia, the H2020 programme has 
contributed to strengthening relations between  
the two. However, not all the institutions proved to 
be equally capable of successfully and continuously  
accessing H2020 funds.  
An analysis of patents in the field indicates low 
European interest in patenting cybersecurity 
solutions. This could be seen as a weakness in 
the collaboration between industry and academy, 
although it is also true that patents cover only  
one aspect of the cybersecurity value chain  
with software licensing occupying the other 
half. China’s dominance in patenting could be 
linked to its pursuit of cybersecurity sovereignty. 
Unfortunately, no data are available to estimate 
the size and ‘value’ of the licensing phenomenon. 
 
The overall picture provided by this analysis is 
positive as the European cybersecurity research 
landscape is vibrant, productive and recognised at 
the global level. However, it could be improved by: 
• Strengthening and enlarging the collaboration 
of cybersecurity research organisations across 
Member States.  
• Streamlining and stabilising the R&D 
cooperation between industry and academia.  
• Better coordinating research funding across 
the EU. 
• Co-designing research plans between funding 
bodies and recipients. 
• Supporting the sharing of highly expensive 
infrastructures (in an Open Laboratory 
Initiative approach). 
The Commission’s proposal to set up a European 
Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research 
Competence Centre and the Network of National 
Coordination Centres (COM(2018)630) is moving 
directly in this direction, aiming to create  
a more collaborative and synergetic European 
cybersecurity competence ecosystem.
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SUMMARY
The vulnerabilities of IoT devices and big data are the new frontier for cyber attacks 
while, at the same time, providing the main sources of information, insights and ana-
lytics that can be used to detect cybersecurity threats. Furthermore, vulnerabilities and 
threats in mobile applications, which are often written by hobbyists, might put citizens’ 
lives in danger. At a different level, although network availability is taken for granted, 
realistically, the absence of connectivity in interdependent networks may occur and 
create an immediate impact in terms of our society’s safety. On a different scale and 
level of maturity, AI, blockchain and quantum technologies can be turning points in 
cybersecurity. 
 
444. Cybersecurity at the heart of digital technological development
The previous section presented societal aspects 
in the interplay of cybersecurity and digital 
transformation. The scope of this section will 
illustrate the emerging technical challenges that 
cybersecurity has to overcome.
 4.1. Big data
Worldwide, citizens, public administrations  
and private companies generate and store  
a vast volume of data every day. A driving  
factor is certainly greater internet connectivity, 
illustrated by the following 2019 statistics:  
• Today, there are more than 1 billion websites 
(Netcraft, 2020), targeted by over 6 billion 
Google queries each day (Internet Live  
Stats, 2020). 
• In 2018, there were over 2.3 billion Facebook 
(Facebook, 2019) and 321 million Twitter 
(Twitter Investor Relations, 2019) active users. 
 
• Every day, around 4 billion videos are viewed 
on YouTube (MerchDope, 2020), and 95 million 
photos and videos are shared on Instagram 
(Instagram, 2020). 
In the digital transformation age, the internet 
went through its second (r)evolution by connecting 
‘everything’, known as the ‘Internet of Everything’ 
(IoE). It is estimated that, by 2025, each connected 
person will have at least one data interaction 
every 18 seconds (Reinsel, Gantz and Rydning, 
2018). Many of these interactions are triggered 
CYBERSECURITY 
AT THE HEART 
OF DIGITAL 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
DEVELOPMENT
The consequences 
of malicious attacks 
on cyber physical 
systems could have 
severe impact on  
human lives and  
the environment.
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by IoT devices that will increasingly enable digital 
technologies to embed themselves in all aspects 
of our economy and society.  
The scenario magnifies some key issues to which 
cybersecurity needs to find the appropriate answers: 
• The big-data paradigm relies on the quality  
of the collected data to extrapolate  
new results, evidence and services.  
The injection of fake data is now the new 
frontier of cyber attacks. In the big-data 
era, cybersecurity must provide a means to 
guarantee the provenance and integrity of 
information used by big-data applications. 
• IoT and wearables are increasing our 
vulnerability 24 hours a day to cyber threats. 
Even worse, instead of following a life-cycle 
approach whereby amendments are done  
over time to strengthen security, a plethora  
of these ‘things’ are deployed in a ‘set  
and forget’ fashion. 
• The exponential growth of the number  
of potential targets reachable online  
increases the complexity of cyber threats  
and attacks detection. 
Reflection is needed on how to tailor cybersecurity 
approaches and solutions to cover the need for 
security in the big-data context, to streamline 
cybersecurity mechanisms at IoT level,  
and to leverage AI to enable a more accurate  
and distributed monitoring of cybersecurity  
across all elements of the big-data value chain.
 4.2. Cybersecurity  
 and hyperconnectivity
The big-data paradigm implies a high availability  
of connectivity: many connected devices require the 
transmission of huge amounts of data in the cloud 
to be stored and/or processed. The advent of the 
5G-based services network will dramatically increase 
this demand in the coming years – in particular for 
real-time processing services. The bandwidth, low 
latency and ubiquity of 5G will not only boost the 
hyperconnectivity of connected devices but will also 
enable new use cases, such as remote real-time 
surgery, smarter and self-driving vehicles, drone 
control and a higher degree of industry automation. 
Critical applications using connected devices 
(for example, in sectors like health, energy 
or automotive) will depend on the reliability 
of communication networks. Today’s digital 
services are developed in a ‘composition fashion’ 
whereby different components are deployed in 
geographically sparse systems and put together 
thanks to the availability of hyperconnectivity.  
In a sense, the problem is that network availability 
is taken for granted today. However, in reality, 
recent episodes show that attacks against what 
can currently be considered as the cornerstone  
of the digital revolution are feasible, and their 
impact can be immense in terms of the safety  
of our society.  
The challenge here is that the internet backbone 
does not have centralised governance, which means 
    In the digital 
transformation 
age, the internet  
has undergone  
a second (r)evolution 
to connect ‘everything’ 
– the ‘Internet  
of Everything’.
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its security cannot be enforced homogeneously. 
Furthermore, this existing trend in greater 
dependency on internet connectivity in all kinds 
of services and products is leading to unforeseen 
impacts due to the complex interdependencies 
created among heterogeneous digital services. 
A cybersecurity attack that results in the 
unavailability of a certain cloud service can initiate 
a cascading effect with adverse consequences  
for those systems that depend on it. 
 4.3. Cybersecurity, mobile devices  
 and the IoT
In an effort to reduce network congestion,  
low-level latency and lower the dependence on 
continuous connectivity, novel data-computing 
architectures were introduced, of note, edge and 
fog computing (see Figure 16). Edge computing 
attempts to perform data processing/filtering on 
the device close to the sensor (the edge) whereas 
fog computing processes data in intermediate 
nodes within the local network itself.  
Mobile devices are good examples of the edge-
computing paradigm as they currently have sufficient 
computational power to perform a plethora of 
tasks locally, while IoT, together with mobile devices 
and gateways, could be seen as the key interface 
between fog computing and the real world.
Despite being conceived for completely different 
reasons, both IoT and mobile devices are expected 
to have a huge impact on the way cybersecurity  
is delivered. Smartphones have now reached  
the majority of the global population (Internet 
World Stats, 2017) and mobile internet traffic 
today exceeds landline traffic (Cimpanu, 2016)  
as shown in Figure 17.
Figure 16: The continuous space of cloud computing
Edge | Devices
Billions of devices Millions of nodes Thousand of data centres
Fog | Nodes Clouds | Data centres
   Critical 
applications 
using distributed 
connected 
devices will depend 
on the reliability 
of communication 
networks.
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In 2018, there were 17 billion connected devices, 
7 billion of which were IoT devices (Knud Lasse 
Lueth, 2018). This number is expected to grow  
to more than 13 billion in 2022, thereby 
overtaking the number of non-IoT connected 
devices worldwide. Similar predictions are also 
reported by Gartner (Omale, 2018), with an 
estimated 25 billion connected things by 2021. 
Many IoT and mobile app vulnerabilities are rooted 
in their design, implementation, and deployment. 
For example, in several cases, mobile apps  
are written by hobbyists or by professionals  
without any cybersecurity background  
and awareness. The same can also be said  
about the average IoT device, which is quite  
often designed with only the target functionality  
to be provided in mind, and with a limited budget  
(IoT and apps must be cheap to take off in 
the market), hence without any attention to 
cybersecurity issues.  
This lack or deficiency of proper cybersecurity 
mechanisms in IoT devices could have direct  
safety implications for the citizen. Medical devices 
and applications, smart-house automation systems, 
and connected cars are just a few items which,  
if hacked, could endanger life (see the follow Box 1 
for an example).
Their criticality, the completely distributed nature  
of such devices, the inability to make assumptions 
on the environment surrounding them, and  
the impossibility of attributing a guaranteed  
level of trust is currently forcing cybersecurity  
to switch from a centralised segregate and defend 
approach to a collaborative and distributed  
device by device defence. This means that each 
element of the technology value chain must be 
conceived with embedded cybersecurity principles, 
including the entire life cycle, from its design to  
its governance.
Figure 17: Internet usage worldwide for the period 2009-2018 (StatCounter, 2020)
    In 2018, there 
were 17 billion 
connected devices,  
7 billion of which  
were IoT devices.
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The future of healthcare will revolve around 
big data and smart medical devices which are 
increasingly connected to the internet, thereby 
making cybersecurity imperative. Science, IoT, 
AI, and data will contribute to the detection 
of disease much earlier and enable disease 
prevention and personalised treatment. Such 
innovation may be called IoMT, which stands 
for the Internet of Medical Things. New actors, 
such as ‘remote healthcare services’, are already 
emerging across the entire ‘healthcare supply 
chain’, and the overall trend will be characterised 
by a shift from ‘hospital care’ towards ‘home care’, 
as illustrated in Figure 18 below. 
People will be equipped with smart devices 
continuously monitoring key health data, such 
as heart rate, blood pressure, electromyography, 
electrocardiogram, nasal airflow, glucose levels, 
weight, activity levels, etc. The data in the IoMT 
era will be transmitted around the clock to remote 
care centres, where algorithms will process them 
to detect early signs of disease. Depending on  
the diagnostic results, remote consultation  
with specialist physicians or physical visits may  
be arranged.  
This new era of ‘connected healthcare’ is based 
on several novel technological developments, 
including 5G networks, big data, AI, cloud 
computing, and augmented reality, among 
others. Each one of these developments offers 
operational performance benefits and risks, most 
notably in the cybersecurity domain. In addition, 
the so-called ‘legacy health systems’ should be 
considered from the point of view of emerging 
cybersecurity risks. 
At the EU scale, medical devices are regulated 
by Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017. 
Known as the MDR (Medical Devices Regulation), 
it came into force on 25 May 2020, amending 
Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 
and Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 and repealing 
Council Directives 90/385/EEC and 93/42/EEC.  
As a relatively recent issue, cybersecurity was 
barely covered by previous legislation. Hence, 
the task of the MDR to include cybersecurity 
specifications is a first of its kind in the EU.  
The JRC has been involved in a task force led 
by the European Commission’s DG GROW which 
has developed guidance for manufacturers to 
implement the MDR’s new essential safety and 
performance requirements related to cybersecurity. 
box 1.  Cybersecurity challenges for connected medical devices
Figure 18: Cost of care – connected healthcare 
provision model based on connected medical devices; 
adapted from (Landers et al., 2016)
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 4.4. Cybersecurity and blockchain
Blockchain can enable parties with no particular 
trust in each other to exchange digital data on  
a peer-to-peer basis with fewer or no third parties 
or intermediaries. Thanks to properties which 
include decentralisation, tamper-resistance, 
transparency, security and smart contracts, 
blockchain has been followed with interest by  
the cybersecurity community, given its potential  
to introduce new mechanisms to ensure trust  
and integrity in digital transactions. 
The intrinsic nature of blockchain has some 
interesting advantages:  
• It provides disintermediation and uses a model 
that does not require trusted parties. 
 
• The parties have full guarantee that  
the transactions will be executed as expected.  
• Being fully distributed, blockchain services  
and the underlying data are resilient to 
failures, DoS and, in general, make a well-
designed system harder to attack. As a result, 
the transactions and data stored in the 
blockchain are themselves resilient to cyber 
attacks and remain under the control of  
the users’ community. 
• Blockchains are transparent and cannot  
be modified. 
In addition, what makes blockchain appealing  
from a cybersecurity perspective is the concept  
of smart contracts, a computer program that  
is embedded in a blockchain which inherits  
the characteristics of blockchain and thus has no 
downtime, censorship or third-party interference. 
As a result, smart contracts cannot be altered, 
thereby covering another cybersecurity priority,  
i.e. process integrity. 
In other words, today, blockchain appears to be  
a promising option to be considered when it comes 
to enforcing trust, resilience to DoS, integrity  
and the authenticity of data and processes. 
 
However, while blockchain holds potential  
benefits for cybersecurity, several challenges 
remain. From a development perspective,  
the main challenge is the lack of best practice 
and experience on how to develop professional 
services based on blockchain in a secure  
way. This also affects the deployment of  
smart contracts. 
 4.5. Cybersecurity and AI
In recent years, revolutionary technological 
developments have brought AI to the centre  
of digital transformation (Annoni et al., 2018; 
Villani, 2018).  
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It is not easy to define AI either as a specific 
scientific discipline or as some form of specific 
computer engineering. AI encompasses many 
disciplines and has itself been through many 
transformations (Stuart J. Russell and Norvig, 
2016; Independent High-Level Expert Group  
on Artificial Intelligence, 2019) since it emerged 
in the 1950s (Moor, 2006). For the purposes 
of this report, we will adhere to the definition 
published by the European Commission’s High-
Level Expert Group on AI (HLEG) (Independent 
High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 
2019). This definition is broad enough to 
encompass virtually all digital or robotic systems 
capable of some form of autonomous action  
or of adapting in some way to its environment  
or new data through some process of learning. 
Although the definition covers several sub-fields 
of AI, for many purposes, we refer to systems 
belonging to machine learning synonymously 
with AI, since they currently produce the most 
successful and important applications of AI. 
The application of at least partly autonomous 
algorithms in cybersecurity is actually not a new 
development13. Cybersecurity controls capable 
of functioning autonomously in order to protect 
systems and services have existed at least since 
the 1990s, for instance, in early methods to detect 
network intrusion (Paxson, 1999). 
However, cybersecurity is increasingly being 
affected by recent developments in AI (Brundage 
et al., 2018; Osoba and Welser, 2017), mainly 
since many parts of the digital sphere are being 
transformed by AI and because it empowers 
cybersecurity itself. The changes ahead for 
cybersecurity include greater capabilities for  
cyber defence, lawful prosecution and digital 
forensics, the introduction of completely new 
types of software vulnerabilities in AI systems,  
and the deliberate malicious use of AI (Brundage  
et al., 2018). 
The well-recognised dual nature of AI systems 
(Brundage et al., 2018) obliges us to reflect on 
the possible malicious use of AI. As with any 
new technology, AI introduces its own limitations 
on robustness against deliberate attacks and 
those of inherent safety, requiring specific new 
developments in AI cybersecurity, regulations  
and standards. These considerations become 
especially relevant in the context of the rising 
deployment of vulnerable AI in cyber physical 
systems and critical infrastructure controls, 
where the potential impact of an AI-related cyber 
incident can have direct harsh consequences in  
the physical world.
 
The intersection of general AI research, AI safety 
and robustness, and cybersecurity is a topic 
of rapidly growing importance for researchers 
and policymakers (see, for example, European 
Commission, 2018a; Amodei et al., 2016; Barreno 
et al., 2006). 
 4.6. Cybersecurity and quantum  
 technologies
New technologies, such as quantum computers  
or quantum communication applications, are  
still very experimental and probably quite far  
from widespread usability. However, their 
potentially transformative impact on cryptography  
and information security warrants their inclusion 
when considering the future of cybersecurity.  
 
In quantum information science, communication 
and information processing are based on quantum 
physical laws and real quantum systems are 
used as information carriers14 (Bennett and 
Shor, 2006). This opens up the possibility for 
the direct technological exploitation of hitherto 
unusable quantum effects for computation. At the 
intersection of physics and computer science, the 
field has steadily evolved in recent decades from 
a theoretical endeavour into high-tech engineering 
(Quantum Flagship, 2019b). Once fully developed, 
the resulting technologies, such as quantum 
computers or quantum communication channels, 
are very likely to have a significant impact on 
computing, telecommunication and applied sciences. 
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For cybersecurity, two developments are of 
particular relevance:  
• The threat posed by quantum computers to 
modern cryptography: Quantum computers, 
when finally deployed, will be able to perform 
tasks which are impossible with a classical 
computer (Nielsen and Chuang, 2011).  
A direct consequence of this is that some 
current cryptographic algorithms, based on 
challenges that are not solvable by classical 
computers, could easily be broken by  
a future quantum computer (Shor, 1994).  
In particular, this would affect communication 
protocols based on public key cryptography  
and, thereby, unsettle the foundations of 
modern cybersecurity. To counterbalance this 
threat, cybersecurity will have to incorporate the 
developing field of post-quantum cryptography, 
the study of quantum-resistant cryptographical 
schemes to replace the old algorithms.  
• The development of quantum cryptography 
techniques, using quantum physical effects to 
improve the security of systems and services: 
the most important applications to date are 
quantum key distribution protocols, promising 
novel ways to use quantum entanglement for 
initiating completely secure communication 
channels between partners. In this context, 
in June 2019, at the Digital Assembly in 
Bucharest, Romania, representatives of  
seven EU countries (Belgium, Germany,  
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands  
and Spain) signed a declaration agreeing  
to explore together how to develop and deploy 
a quantum communication infrastructure 
(QCI) across the EU within the next 10 years. 
It is still hard to predict when a functioning quantum 
computer will be available or when quantum 
cryptography techniques will be in widespread use. 
Nonetheless, there is a real possibility that this  
will happen sooner rather than later. Quantum 
computing experts who responded to a JRC survey 
(Travagnin et al., 2018) gave a median estimate of 
2032 ± 11.5 years for when current cryptographic 
protocols might be broken. Quantum key distribution 
is available commercially for certain niche use-
cases and there have been several dozen medium 
to large scale publicly-funded trial deployments 
worldwide (Travagnin and Lewis, 2019). It is also  
the subject of much ongoing research see,  
for example, the European Commission-funded 
Quantum Flagship projects CIVIQ, QIA, QRANGE  
and UNIQORN, and the OpenQKD testbed (Quantum 
Flagship, 2019a). 
In light of these uncertain predictions, any 
discussions on cybersecurity should already 
consider new quantum technologies. 
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SUMMARY
Cyber attacks continue to evolve and become more complex, taking advantage 
of technological evolutions. Although the main goal behind such attacks is usually 
financial gain, other motives may also be present, such as ideals. Attacks will always 
be feasible as no system is absolutely secure – it will always come down to correctly 
identifying the risks and the potential impact of an attack and thus protecting against 
it. Moreover, as the number of devices and technologies used continues to increase, 
so does the attack surface and the ways in which a system may be compromised. 
Although the vulnerabilities related to such attacks can vary, the human factor remains 
a constant weakness. 
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EVOLUTION OF 
CYBERSECURITY 
RISKS
This chapter explores in detail the potential 
effects of digital transformation and technological 
development increasing the risks associated with 
cyber attacks.  
 
As shown in Figure 19, the number of cyber 
attacks has grown constantly over the years, with 
a corresponding growth in the resulting financial 
damage. For instance, the average cost of a data 
breach was estimated to be EUR 3.5 million in 
2018, an increase of 6.4 % over the previous year 
(Ponemon Institute, 2018). More generally, it is 
foreseen that by 2021, cyber criminal activities 
will have an annual global cost of EUR 5.5 trillion 
(Cybersecurity Ventures, 2019).
We must ensure  
that the positive  
effects of digital 
transformation  
in cybersecurity  
will outweigh  
the negative ones.
Figure 19: Increasing frequency of cyber attacks over the period 2015-2018 (percentages rounded to the nearest 
integer number) (Radware 2019)
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To better understand how to counter this trend  
it is important to understand risk both in  
the cybersecurity context and in the evolution  
of the cyber threat landscape scenario, in terms  
of actors, motivations and targets. Only in this 
way will it be possible to identify and prioritise  
the correct mitigation actions and strategies.
 5.1. A cybersecurity conceptual model
Cybersecurity risk, like any other type of risk, is 
the combination of two main factors: how likely 
a negative cyber event is to happen and the 
potential consequences of such an event. Even 
if an event is not likely but its impact is large, 
the resulting risk will still be very significant. For 
example, this is the case when the outcome of a 
cyber attack can put human lives at risk, albeit 
the chances of it occurring might be generally low. 
Therefore, even in very unlikely threat scenarios, 
the risk still needs to be properly addressed to 
prevent a potential disaster. An example of such 
a scenario could be a major terror cyber attack 
against some component of a country’s nuclear 
plant installations.  
The likelihood that a negative cyber event will 
take place depends on who might be motivated 
to conduct the attack and on how the attack 
could take place (Joint Task Force Transformation 
Initiative, 2012). The impact is the consequence of 
a successful attack on the target. 
Cybersecurity risk is based precisely on these 
three main dimensions: threat actors (i.e. 
cyber attackers), vulnerabilities (i.e. systemic 
weaknesses) and impacts (i.e. adverse effects 
of successful cyber attacks, either intended or 
collateral). Figure 20 puts these three dimensions 
of cybersecurity into context, showing their 
interconnection and their role in the composition 
of the cybersecurity risk.
There are clear interactions between all 
dimensions, depicted by the innermost clockwise 
circle of arrows.  
• Threat actors refer to any actor or group with 
a motivation to carry out a cyber attack to 
secure a certain reward. This can include the 
full spectrum from mere cyber criminals who 
seek to make money, to activists following  
an ideology, or to state-sponsored attackers. 
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Figure 20: Conceptual model depicting the logical 
links between the different components of  
the cybersecurity risk in the context of the influence 
of digital transformation
    The average 
cost of a data 
breach was 
estimated at  
EUR 3.27 million 
in 2018.
• Threat vectors are the means at the disposal  
of threat actors to exploit existing 
vulnerabilities by using a threat tool for 
a cyber attack, depicted by the first inner 
arrow. Threat tools are any form of malicious 
software, also known as malware, for instance 
a computer virus. Vulnerabilities can take 
on many specific forms, but mainly reflect 
security weaknesses in the design of software 
and computer code.  
• Threat actors seek to receive a reward from 
their attack, ultimately causing the impact.  
An impact of a cyber attack is usually caused 
by a combination of rewards intentionally 
sought by the perpetrator – for instance,  
the money stolen by a banking Trojan –  
and collateral damage of the attack –  
for example, a ransomware attack that  
results in the disruption of systems  
and communication networks.
 
The area within the three overlapping circles  
in Figure 20 represents the effective cybersecurity 
risk. In theory, no risk exists if one of the three key 
elements is absent. Likewise, the risk is greatest  
if all three factors are high simultaneously.  
In the real world, vulnerabilities always exist as  
no ICT system is perfectly secure, nothing is 
without impact and there will always be some 
motivation for threat actors to attack a system. 
Thus, the goal of a cybersecurity risk assessment 
is always to determine the magnitude of risk, not 
whether it is present or not. If the estimated risk 
warrants action, taking into account the limited 
resources, mitigation strategies (controls) need to 
be devised to reduce that risk to an acceptable 
level, i.e. ‘residual risk’.
Cybersecurity risk can either be mitigated by 
deploying mechanisms aimed at reducing  
the cyber threats (e.g. deterrent actions, such 
as cybercrime prosecution), or those to prevent 
vulnerabilities (e.g. identification of vulnerabilities 
and software patching to correct them) or 
mechanisms to mitigate the effect of impacts  
(i.e. increased resilience). The level of risk 
acceptance is often combined with another  
aspect of risk management, the transferral –  
i.e. the contractual shifting of a risk from one  
part to another through insurance.
Digital transformation constantly creates new 
digital assets, which can be vulnerable to  
cyber attacks, thereby increasing rewards  
and motivations for threat actors. This enlarges 
the so-called attack surface15, ultimately leading 
to higher potential impacts of cyber attacks.
However, cybersecurity risk can also be contained 
by putting in place the right countermeasures 
at the technical, organisational and societal 
levels. Such strategies can positively influence 
these forces by supporting and helping to better 
counteract threats, vulnerabilities and impacts. 
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Thus, the basic challenge ahead for cybersecurity 
lies in ensuring that the positive effects of digital 
transformation will outweigh the negative.
  5.2. Evolution of the cyber threat
 landscape
To better understand how the landscape of  
cyber threat actors is evolving, it is important to 
start by detailing the possible profiles of those 
behind a cyber attack before clearly analysing 
their motivations.
 5.2.1 Threat actors
Here is a typical classification of threat actors 
grouped by their motivation (ENISA, 2019c;  
CSAN, 2018):  
• Cyber criminals. Professional criminals mainly 
motivated by financial gain and the most 
active group in the threat landscape.  
• Insiders. Personnel (current or former) within 
targeted organisations, such as employers and 
contractors. They can cause security incidents 
intentionally or unintentionally. Intentional 
attacks usually have a financial motivation.  
• State-sponsored. Government-funded  
actors, highly skilled and traditionally seen  
as the threat actor with the most resources 
and capabilities. They are motivated by 
political and geopolitical agendas. 
• Hacktivists. Individuals motivated by social 
or political movements, without links to 
governments or private corporations.  
• Cyber terrorists. Individuals motivated  
by political or religious extremist beliefs  
and ideology.  
• Script kiddies. Typically people with limited 
knowledge of hacking, relying on publicly 
available third-party tools to conduct  
their attacks. Their lack of knowledge limits 
their awareness of the consequences of  
their actions. Their main motivations are 
mischief, ego, curiosity and thrill-seeking. 
Although there is a clear distinction in the 
motivations among threat actors, in recent years, 
the differences in terms of skills and resources 
have diminished (ENISA, 2019c; CSAN, 2018). 
Moreover, threat actors can act on behalf of more 
than one category. Cyber criminals, for example, 
may offer their services to third parties like 
hacktivists or state-sponsored groups, whereas  
an individual working in a state-sponsored  
group could end up becoming a hacktivist  
or an insider. In terms of resources, in the past, 
state-sponsored actors were considered more 
capable, but nowadays trends show that groups 
like cyber criminals are comparable in terms  
of skills and resources. Quite often, top-tier 
criminal syndicates as well as state-sponsored 
groups are referred to as advanced persistent 
threats (APTs).
This reduction in the capability gap among  
the various groups of threat actors is due to 
several circumstances. In this era of digital 
information, the knowledge to conduct cyber 
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attacks can usually be acquired very cheaply 
or even for free. In addition, the proliferation 
of the cyber criminal market reduces the cost 
of launching cyber attacks. Crime-as-a-Service 
(CaaS) has proven to be a lucrative business, 
thanks in part to the myriad of devices that came 
online with the digital revolution. For example, 
launching a DDoS attack nowadays is as simple 
as subscribing to a mobile company as criminal 
services are offered on the dark web to anyone 
without requiring any specific knowledge  
or resources, as depicted in Figure 21.
Hence, cybersecurity experts are increasingly 
being faced with the problem of clearly 
categorising hypothetical threat actors and their 
resources. This trend is reflected in aggregated 
data on threat-actor motivations, where it can  
be clearly seen how non-attributable motives are 
becoming increasingly significant (see Figure 22).
In this new context, the best way forward is 
to move away from an approach whereby 
cybersecurity measures are identified and applied 
after the IT system has been designed and 
eventually breached to a model of security-by-
design in which cybersecurity is an integral part  
of products and services.
Another complex problem is how to identify  
threat actors and attribute a cyber attack to  
its original set of perpetrators in the context of 
their motivation. First, threat actors are making 
greater use of technology to cover their tracks:  
for instance, by using specific network protocols  
or email as their attack vectors. Second, 
threat actors deliberately obfuscate their real 
motivations by pretending to conduct another 
type of attack. And lastly, due to the virtual 
borderless nature of the internet and the relative 
ease of making use of threat tools or CaaS, single 
actors now have the possibility of simultaneously 
targeting thousands, or even millions of citizens 
and infrastructure targets. 
The same – possibly single individual threat actor 
– who impacts millions of targets on one side 
of the globe, can physically reside in a different 
country, i.e. outside the jurisdiction of the country 
where the damage has been caused. This problem 
is crucial for lawful prosecution efforts as well as 
for issues of national security and defence.  
For a general overview, Figure 22 illustrates  
the motivation behind cyber incidents in recent 
years (Radware, 2019).
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Figure 21: Price list of a service offering DDoS attacks (Makrushin, 2017)
 5.2.2 Financial motivations  
 behind cybercrime 
Cyber criminals have always found creative ways  
to ‘monetise’ their attacks. Thus, obvious targets 
for threat actors include all digital transactions 
and, more specifically, online banking. In 2016, 
the estimated fraud from online payments was 
EUR 1.8 billion, 35 % more than in 2012 (European 
Central Bank, 2018). In recent years, there has 
been an increase in incidents directly targeting 
banks rather than end-users, such as the attack 
against the Bangladesh Central Bank in 2016.
Cyber criminals are also adapting their strategies 
in line with technological trends, such as the 
cryptocurrency boom. Drawing a parallel with 
‘traditional online banking’, cyber attacks in 
 the domain of cryptocurrencies are directed 
towards end-users – aiming to steal the content of 
cryptocurrencies wallets – or towards higher-profile 
targets, such as the attack against the MtGox 
cryptocurrency exchange in 2013 (Leyden, 2013). 
Mobile banking malware is another example of 
how criminals have adapted to the digital economy. 
Threat actors have also been ingenious in designing 
new approaches to steal cryptocurrencies. 
Compromised machines, more traditionally used 
to conduct advanced attacks (e.g. DDoS, SPAM 
campaign, etc.), are now also being exploited 
for their computational performances to mine 
cryptocurrencies. Such a technique, called 
cryptojacking, is yet another use case of the 
well-known botnets, networks of compromised 
machines controlled by one or more central nodes.
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Figure 22: Overview of the motivations identified behind cyber attacks. The data come from an annual survey 
by Radware of 790 organisations of various types. The percentage indicates the share of respondents who were 
victims of a cyber attack.
Last but not least, the features offered by some 
cryptocurrencies in terms of flexibility, ubiquity 
and anonymity have been welcomed by cyber 
criminals. They are often the choice for the receipt 
of ransoms, a modern strategy employed by 
cyber criminals to access a more recent source or 
revenue (Europol, 2018). Typical examples of these 
attacks make use of ransomware, in which threat 
actors block access to data or resources until  
the ransom is paid. 
The Ponemon Institute produces an annual report 
analysing the cost of data breaches (Ponemon 
Institute, 2018). According to their results, the 
average total cost of a single data breach in 2018 
was EUR 3.6 million, representing an average cost 
per lost or stolen record of EUR 137. The number 
of known data breaches per year continues to 
increase globally, as illustrated in Figure 23, 
highlighting the importance of this topic.
 
While attacks may be motivated by financial gain, 
money is not the main driver behind the main risks 
society faces today. 
 5.2.3  Cyber warfare, hybrid threats  
 and hacktivism 
The range of impacts from attacks driven by 
ideologies or (political) agendas rather than 
money16 is extensive. It includes targeted cyber 
espionage activities threatening companies’ 
intellectual property, cyber attacks against critical 
infrastructure with potentially dramatic effects 
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In February 2016, a group of hackers infiltrated 
the Bangladesh Central Bank and stole  
EUR 74 million. The attackers managed to send 
35 SWIFT instructions ordering the transfer  
of USD 1 billion (EUR 912 million) from  
the bank’s account in the Federal Reserve  
Bank of New York. The first four transfers  
went through, but the fifth one was stopped 
due to a spelling mistake in the recipient’s 
name (Serajul Quadir, 2016). The attack was 
attributed to a group suspected of ties to  
the North Korean government (the Lazarus 
Group) (Symantec, 2017; Corkery and Goldstein, 
2017), although the authorities did not rule out 
the participation of an insider agent (Devlin 
Barrett and O’Keeffe, 2016). 
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Figure 23: Number of data breaches in recent years
on the physical world, disinformation campaigns 
aiming to provoke emotional and psychological 
effects within society, or even the deployment  
of cyber capabilities in a military conflict to 
support regular warfare. One such example of  
a hybrid attack is that against Ukraine’s electricity 
infrastructure which temporarily disrupted 
electricity supply to over 225 000 consumers in 
December 2015 (Styczynski, Beach-Westmoreland 
and Stables, 2016). 
The common reason behind these attacks is their 
strategic reach, potentially weakening national 
security. This probably explains the steep increase 
in state-sponsored cyber incidents (Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2019) often connected to 
activities considered as a hybrid threat (European 
Commission, 2017c; Treverton et al., 2018). 
Unfortunately, unequivocal state attribution of 
such sophisticated cyber attacks is very difficult. 
A prominent example is the case of the malware 
‘NotPetya’ (Greenberg, 2018). In 2017, it quickly 
spread all over the world, encrypting data and 
demanding a payment for recovery. In the end, 
analysts tend to agree on the fact that NotPetya 
had only disguised itself as ransomware; the real 
objective was to destabilise the initial target, 
Ukraine, through a series of attacks aimed at 
making some key services useless for a certain 
period of time. This new way of attacking makes 
it difficult to detect and attribute attacks, thereby 
leaving no way to swiftly mount any defence 
against the original threat actor.  
It should be noted that the EU’s ‘Cyber Diplomacy 
Toolbox’ explicitly retains the possibility to react 
diplomatically even when attribution is not entirely 
clear, marking a major shift in European policy 
(Council of the European Union, 2017; Bendiek, 
2018). In this context, the EU is collaborating 
closely with NATO as hybrid threats often  
have military implications. In the EU-NATO  
Joint Declaration of Warsaw in 2016, 20 of  
the 74 proposals are devoted to hybrid threats.
From a geopolitical perspective, the emergence  
of cyber diplomacy issues raises the need to 
access innovative cybersecurity solutions to 
protect relevant national assets. Considering  
the current market in cybersecurity products, this 
will lead to looking for solutions beyond European 
borders. For that reason, the focus is increasingly 
on considering cybersecurity in discussions on 
strategic autonomy, especially when it comes to 
digital supply chains and critical infrastructures. 
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A recent example of this is the controversy over 
whether or not to allow Huawei, a Chinese tech 
company, to build European infrastructure for  
5G networks (Cerulus, 2017). 
  5.3. Evolution of attack surfaces  
 and attack tools 
As no ICT system can be formally proven to  
be totally secure, the question that should be 
asked about security is not whether a system 
could be compromised but rather ‘when, how  
and with what impact’. Regarding the ‘when’, 
clearly it is impossible to provide an answer  
a priori (without relying on certain intelligence 
information). ‘How’ and ‘what impact’ are  
essential questions which form the basis of 
cybersecurity strategy. This section will provide 
a brief overview of the evolution of how cyber 
attacks are executed and the typical vulnerabilities 
of modern IT systems.
 5.3.1 Digital transformation  
 and attack tools
The widening of the attack surface is a clear 
opportunity for threat actors to increase  
the diversity of targets and the variety of threat 
tools. Such an evolution is depicted in Figure 24, 
based on insights provided by ENISA’s Threat 
Landscape Report (ENISA, 2019c; 2012; 2013; 
2015; 2016b; 2017) published annually. 
 
One of the most evident trends is the decline  
in recent years in the use of exploit kits (a utility 
program that attackers use to launch exploits 
against vulnerable programs). While exploit  
kits are turnkey solutions that are still in use, 
lately, threat actors have favoured other types 
of attack vectors, in particular those that employ 
legitimate tools, including penetration testing 
software. The reason behind this shift is that  
the maintenance of such tools is expensive  
and requires specific skills, which can be 
circumvented when misusing legitimate, often 
free-of-charge, well-maintained software. 
This legitimate versus illegitimate use of 
machines, tools and, nowadays, software, is 
something cybersecurity must deal with properly. 
This is especially true for new and emerging 
technologies and cybersecurity tools themselves. 
New technologies are often not fully understood 
when introduced and, moreover, lack standards  
or regulation regarding their exploitation  
and usage. A very relevant example from the 
current technological landscape is the potential 
use of AI tools and techniques by threat actors. 
We are only at the beginning of the widespread 
use of AI-based systems and, as a result, have 
not yet witnessed widespread misuse. However, 
cybersecurity should be both aware and ahead 
of this trend. It is entirely reasonable to expect 
more developments, including the increased 
targeting of human vulnerabilities via autonomous 
social engineering, social media manipulation, 
and AI-based fake content, or the development 
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In April 2007, Estonia, which was already  
an advanced digital society, suffered a series 
of coordinated cyber attacks that targeted 
governmental institutions and bodies, financial 
entities, telecommunication infrastructure and 
newspapers. A surge of DDoS attacks lasting 
several weeks caused disruptions at institutional 
sites and in national online public services 
and communications, impacting the normal 
functioning of the national government and 
society (Schmidt, 2013). These attacks were not 
highly sophisticated and, due to their nature, did 
not create any lasting damage to Estonia’s digital 
infrastructure. However, they demonstrated how 
cyber attacks taking advantage of the digital 
transformation of governments and society 
could severely harm an entire country (Joubert, 
2012). These attacks helped to shape Estonia 
into the leader in cyber defence it is today.
box 3.  The attack against Estonia
of unregulated autonomous cyber weapon or 
even real-weapon systems (Annoni et al., 2018; 
Brundage et al., 2018; Svenmarck et al., 2018). 
When it comes to cybersecurity tools, it is 
important to understand that they can be misused 
quite easily to perform offensive actions, and that 
this is inevitable. However, it is also important 
to underline that offensive cybersecurity is not 
automatically the prerogative of malicious actors. 
Law-enforcement agencies need to employ 
advanced tools or approaches themselves to 
conduct lawful interception or to decrypt legally 
obtained evidence (e.g. consider key escrow 
technologies, code-obfuscation technologies,  
and backdoors). To counteract certain types  
of cyber attacks, it is almost inevitable to engage 
in offensive activities oneself, a prominent 
example being taking down a botnet.  
For this important matter, it is necessary to 
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Figure 24: Evolution of the most-used attack vectors in the previous seven years
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reflect on society’s underlying security needs. 
This complexity is captured by B. Schneier in his 
2019 paper ‘Cybersecurity for the Public Interest’ 
(Schneier, 2019a).
 5.3.2 Malware
Over the last five years, malware has been the most 
common attack vector, as shown in Figure 25. 
Malware can be defined as any code that has 
invaded a system or a service, aiming to affect its 
normal behaviour, for instance, by granting non-
authorised access, blocking computing resources, 
or leaking private information. Several threat 
assessments have introduced a refined taxonomy 
of malware as it is considered that some types 
of malware deserve specific treatment, such as 
ransomware, banking Trojans and many others. 
This report does not delve into this level of detail 
but instead refers to malware in broad terms  
and only using more specific terms where relevant. 
As illustrated in Figure 25, the use of malware  
has increased constantly over the last decade. 
More specifically, AV-Test spotted a rise in  
the number of malware from 47 million in  
2010 to 868 million in 2018 (AV-TEST, 2018).  
For example, malware targeting mobile platforms 
increased from 5 million in 2014 to 20 million  
in 2017, according to McAfee (McAfee, 2018).  
There have been several massive attacks targeting 
the plethora of new pervasive devices, such as 
the Mirai botnet which affected a myriad of IoT 
devices (Kolias et al., 2017). 
Today, malware is becoming an extremely 
elaborate tool able to adopt a number of 
techniques in order to remain hidden. Threat 
actors are increasingly taking advantage of cloud 
services, email providers, VPN services, etc. to 
reduce their activity footprint to allow them to 
remain undetected. In addition, the communication 
channel malware uses to exchange information 
with the threat actors is becoming encrypted  
more and more frequently. Cisco has pointed out  
a 300 % increase in encrypted communication 
from malicious software (Cisco, 2018). Malware 
is even seen now as a service as criminals are 
providing 24/7 customer support together with 
patches and updates to reinforce their malicious 
software (Europol, 2014b).
 5.3.3 Vulnerabilities 
Although attack tools differ at many levels  
(e.g. sophistication, target, impact, etc.), they all 
need an entry point into the targeted system(s). 
Vulnerabilities are not necessarily technological 
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Figure 25: Malware evolution from 2010 to 2019, according to AV-TEST
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or undesired in the first place. They can appear 
intentionally or otherwise during the design  
of the underlying code, its implementation  
or integration within the full architecture.  
There may also be a weakness in the foreseen 
used protocol, in a company’s business processes,  
or in the end-user’s understanding of the message,  
etc. Surprisingly, while security awareness 
is steadily growing, the number of detected 
vulnerabilities is also growing.
 
Technical limitations 
External factors can add unavoidable constraints, 
sometimes at the expense of correct security 
properties. Such technical limitations can come 
from the specifications of a newly designed 
system. For example, the deployment of mobile 
sensors over wide areas – e.g. to enhance forest 
monitoring (White et al., 2016) – requires small, 
autonomous sensors. Such devices have limited 
processing, memory, and battery capabilities, 
thereby excluding the use of well-known  
and widely deployed security mechanisms.
Technical limitations can also be the consequence 
of the digitalisation of previously isolated systems. 
This is particularly relevant in the case of critical  
infrastructure and Industry 4.0. As industrial 
installations, especially large ones such as 
petrochemical installations or energy power 
plants, are expensive to build and maintain,  
their evolution typically follows an incremental, 
plug-in approach: new technologies have been 
added on top of the existing layers to guarantee 
backward compatibility with the devices that  
could not be changed. 
This situation has resulted in the simultaneous 
coexistence of modern IoT devices and legacy 
devices. The fact is that legacy devices were 
deployed when industrial installations were 
considered a ‘closed environment’, difficult 
to access remotely, and therefore designed 
without any specific form of protection against 
cyber attacks. Thus, the ‘opening up’ of these 
infrastructures to the external world to exploit  
the potentials of IoT is potentially exposing 
vulnerable legacy systems to cyber attacks. 
New technologies mean  
unforeseen weaknesses
Understanding the potential security flaws  
that new technologies entail from day one is  
a challenge in itself. A new vulnerability or design 
flaw in such a system can be of a very different 
nature, making its identification potentially harder 
at the very beginning. For example, this could be 
expected from quantum technologies opening up 
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new vulnerabilities in systems hitherto expected 
to be secure by means of legacy encryption 
techniques. Further, tracing an event and its cause, 
such as an attack on a system and its exploited 
vulnerability, can be a much more demanding task 
if the new technology is introducing inherently 
more complex systems.
The recent boom in AI-based systems is a concrete 
example of such a situation. In AI software, 
complex dependencies between the algorithm,  
the data with which the algorithm is trained,  
and the final AI model produced create entirely 
new ways to attack an ICT system. This situation  
is illustrated in Figure 26 where by corrupting  
the data provided to the AI algorithm the attacker 
attempts to modify either the model generated 
by the algorithm or the decision taken using this 
model. There is growing evidence of just how 
easily these new vulnerabilities can be exploited in 
real applications (Biggio and Roli, 2018), affecting 
cyber physical systems such as autonomous cars, 
and thereby creating tangible dangers for end-
users’ lives (Eykholt et al., 2018). As the number  
of real-world systems containing an AI component 
is likely to grow, safeguarding such systems is 
of the utmost importance. Without doubt, the 
challenge to provide AI systems able to withstand 
malicious attacks will play an increasingly critical 
role in the cybersecurity arena.
The human factor
Software vulnerabilities are not the only entry 
point of an attack. Sometimes end-users 
unwittingly facilitate this through a lack of 
understanding of their actions. For example, 
although security updates are crucial to limit  
the impact of discovered vulnerabilities, users  
do not always apply security patches, thereby 
leaving the door open for attackers. In 2017,  
41 % of Android users had not updated their 
phone for at least two months (Symantec, 2018). 
As a consequence, even if a given vulnerability is 
fixed, lack of human intervention is the remaining 
vulnerability allowing an attack to occur. 
 
In other cases, the user installs a malware  
through a phishing attack giving key information 
through a social engineering approach, or installs  
an application on his or her mobile without paying 
attention to the permissions they grant to  
the application. This has been a feature throughout 
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Figure 26: The inclusion of AI components may affect the security of the underlying system
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the COVID-19 pandemic where, from the very 
beginning, phishing attacks have taken place, taking 
advantage of people’s vulnerability throughout  
this period. 
Sometimes, the security of a system also 
relies heavily on the user. Password-based 
authentication is known to have its limitations 
as humans are typically inefficient in generating 
and/or remembering randomness. Therefore, 
while some systems are secured with strong 
mechanisms, they may collapse because of  
a weak password or the reuse of passwords  
for websites and online services. In some cases, 
even a secure password can fall victim to  
a targeted social engineering attack involving 
the human behind the password. Two-factor 
authentication aims to reduce the impact of weak 
passwords by adding an extra security component.
  5.4. Growing impact of cyber attacks
In many scenarios, cyber attackers deliberately 
attempt to minimise the appearance of visible 
impacts in order to keep a low profile and 
maximise the reward obtained from a cyber 
attack. However, this does not imply that there  
will be no impact. 
APTs are a good example of this. In APT scenarios, 
the impact is not immediately obvious as attackers  
aim to maximise their persistence in the compromise  
assets, further extending their presence over time 
by means of lateral movements. The impact will 
build up over time as no actions will be taken to 
mitigate it because initially it will not be obvious 
to the organisations affected. In this case, impacts 
tend to be higher in magnitude and scope.
In this context, it is also worth noting that  
the modern digital ecosystem exhibits complex 
interdependencies and that cyber attacks rarely 
occur in a linear fashion. Consequently, additional 
impacts will result from the exploitation of these 
dependencies. For example, in the DoS attacks 
conducted by the Mirai botnet in 2016, in addition 
to the loss of availability for the cyber attack 
targets (including parts of the DNS), additional 
impacts were registered due to abuse of  
the hundreds of thousands of compromised IoT 
devices used to conduct the attacks (e.g. consumer 
bandwidth consumed, degradation of the availability  
of the devices’ legitimate functions, etc.). 
Cyber attacks that compromise the security of 
personal data are another relevant trend today. 
Massive cross-border personal data breaches can 
cause harm to millions of people who suddenly 
realise that their personal data can be violated 
by third parties threatening their fundamental 
right to privacy and data. Victims become more 
vulnerable to subsequent cyber attacks which 
misuse that information, such as online identity 
theft, financial fraud or extortion. Furthermore,  
the disclosure of personal information, in 
particular that of a sensitive nature, can have 
serious consequences for the individuals affected. 
This type of privacy incident also adversely affects 
the organisation that suffered the breach in the 
form of loss of trust by investors and customers 
as well as potential lawsuits and fines.
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   While some  
systems are  
secured with  
strong mechanisms, 
they may collapse 
because of a weak 
password.
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On 12 May 2017, the WannaCry cyber 
attack impacted the UK’s National Health 
Service, affecting one-third of hospital 
trusts in England and over 600 primary-
care and other NHS organisations (Smart, 
2018; National Audit Office (NAO), 2018).  
As a result, hospitals could not receive 
patients, appointments had to be cancelled 
and staff had to rely on pen and paper given 
the malfunctioning of computer systems 
and communications. The overall estimated  
cost of the WannaCry cyber attack on  
the NHS was estimated to be £ 92 million 
(Department of health & Social Care (NHS) 
UK, 2018). 
It was estimated that WannaCry ansomware 
infected over 230 000 computers in  
150 countries on the first day alone 
(Department of health & Social Care (NHS) 
UK, 2018). This global ransomware outbreak 
revealed the weaknesses of governmental 
and industrial digital infrastructures around  
the globe and, in certain cases, caused 
major impacts on citizens, industry  
and governments.
box 4. Impact of the WannaCry cyber  
 attack on the UK’s National  
 Health Service (NHS)
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SUMMARY
The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted many aspects of our everyday lives as the 
basic layers of our society have come under pressure. At a first glance, even though 
cybersecurity may appear to be an unrelated domain, it has been in the spotlight 
during this period. The unexpected increase in demand for digital services has been 
seen by cyber criminals as an opportunity to profit from the current situation, tar-
geting businesses, governments and citizens. This chapter provides a snapshot of 
the actual evolution of cyber threats in relation the COVID-19 pandemic, and aims 
to demonstrate how cybersecurity is currently an important societal need, especially 
when global crises arise. 
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CYBER THREATS 
EVOLUTION AT THE 
TIME OF COVID-19
The events of the first half of 2020, with  
the COVID-19 pandemic hitting hard around  
the world, will be remembered for a long time.  
All the basic layers of our society have been 
put under pressure, even domains such as 
cybersecurity which initially may have seemed 
far removed from the pandemic. The sudden 
large-scale move to teleworking, the use of digital 
services in hospitals, laboratories and government 
services, and the explosion in online schooling 
simultaneously accelerated the digitalisation  
of our society and, unfortunately, enlarged the 
attack surface at the disposal of malicious actors.  
In other words, all the risk scenarios described  
in the previous section materialised together in  
the space of just a few weeks. This section 
presents a snapshot of the evolution of cyber 
threats in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic  
and demonstrates how cybersecurity is currently  
a societal need, especially when global crises arise. 
Below, we present a sort of ‘war-diary’ snapshot  
of cyber threats linked to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
 6.1. Malware (excluding ransomware)
In January and February 2020, reports of phishing 
campaigns and malware were already circulating17. 
On 13 February, a fake Chrome browser plugin 
(O’Donnell, 2020) employing COVID19-themed 
videos was used to empty victims’ bank accounts. 
On March 18, researchers from CheckPoint 
(Lakshmanan, 2020b) revealed that hackers had 
created thousands of COVID-19-related websites 
as bait. Other recent reports note that cybercrooks 
altered their malvertising campaigns by making 
them COVID-19 relevant (Avast Threat Intelligence 
Team, 2020).
Spurred by the support measures taken by 
governments to assist people and businesses, 
there was a huge increase in targeted identity 
spoofing, typically by encouraging victims to click 
on seemingly trustworthy links and divulging 
personal information. On 19 March, IBM exposed  
a cyber criminal campaign aimed at distributing  
a keylogger via coronavirus-themed emails  
with messages impersonating the WHO Director-
General, entitled ‘Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) 
CURE’. In a similar attack, dated 9 April18, cyber 
criminals impersonated President Donald Trump 
and the White House.
Cybersecurity is  
fundamental to  
ensure operational 
and business  
continuity in periods 
of crises.
COVID19-themed phishing also attacked industries 
and critical services, including aerospace, 
transport, manufacturing, hospitality, healthcare, 
and insurance, and has been distributed in several 
languages, including English, French, Italian, 
Japanese, and Turkish (Tidy, 2020a). Around  
13 March, the WHO detected attempts to infiltrate 
their networks via a series of phishing emails (Satter, 
Stubbs, and Bing, 2020). There were also reports 
of attackers impersonating WHO staff to conduct 
cyber attacks (World Health Organization, 2020).
Examples of trojans used by cyber criminals  
also escalated in late March 2020, all exploiting  
a vulnerable public. Malwarebytes (Malwarebytes 
Threat Intelligence Team, 2020b), reported on  
an antivirus software allegedly capable of fighting 
real-life COVID-19 which installed a remote-
access trojan. On March 25, Kaspersky researchers 
warned (Eremin, 2020) of the Ginp Android 
banking trojan which used a ‘Coronavirus Finder’, 
offering information on who was infected  
with COVID-19 in the user’s vicinity for a minor 
charge, but which instead acquired the victim’s 
credit-card details. On 25 March, Bitdefender 
(Arsene, 2020) reported that hackers were 
exploiting vulnerable routers to drop a malicious 
‘WHO’ COVID-19 app. According to a 30 March 
report (Gatlan, 2020a), a banking malware was 
spreading through COVID-19 relief fund files 
where victims received phishing emails asking 
them to donate money by filling in forms  
for a coronavirus relief fund which instead 
downloaded the malware. 
During the first week of April, ZDNet identified 
at least five new COVID-19-themed malware 
strains destined to wipe or rewrite files to disable 
a computer from rebooting (Cimpanu, 2020c). 
Kaspersky (Shcherbakova, 2020) unveiled a new 
type of phishing COVID-19-inspired scams that 
impersonated shipping carriers, including FedEx, 
UPS, and DHL to install a trojan or backdoor for 
vulnerable customers. With many people under 
lockdown, Microsoft warned that pirate streaming 
services and movie piracy sites were dropping 
malware (Gatlan, 2020b).
The April bulletins issued by CERT-EU reported  
at least 16 new family apps, all pretending  
to be legitimate COVID-19 software tools. 
According to a Europol report dated 14 April 2020,  
the number of malware families using COVID-19 
continued to grow. ENISA reported in early May  
on the increasing sophistication and complexity  
of phishing and malware attacks since the 
pandemic hit Europe. On a more positive note,  
the growth now seems to be gradually receding. 
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 6.2. Ransomware
Attacks on critical sectors and services, including 
energy, transportation, education, and healthcare 
have also proliferated. In February, the INA  
Group, Croatia's biggest oil company, became  
the victim of a ransomware infection (Cybersecurity 
Help, 2020a), while in the USA, a natural-gas 
processing plant was also compromised (CISA, 
2020b). Within a day of ransomware operators 
stating that they would stop targeting health  
and medical organisations (Abrams, 2020b),  
the Maze ransomware group leaked sensitive data 
from a UK medical facility involved in coronavirus 
research following its refusal to pay a ransom 
(Goodwin, 2020).
Incidents continued throughout March and April 
in the USA and Europe with ransomware attacks 
on government and public health departments. 
Examples in the USA include the attack on a public 
health district in Illinois, a variety of attacks on 
hospitals using the Active Directory credentials 
ransomware and a hospital in Colorado treating 
COVID-19 patients (Pressey, 2020) and (CERT-EU, 
2020a). Data from ExecuPharm, a pharmaceutical 
company, were posted on the dark web (Whittaker, 
2020) and a wide range of confidential details 
from Berkine, a crude-oil exploration firm, were 
published by the Maze ransomware operator 
(Varghese, 2020).
In France, the IT systems used by several local 
authorities fell victim to ransomware attacks 
(Cimpanu, 2020a), while in Portugal, the systems 
of multinational electric power giant Energias  
de Portugal and the world’s fourth largest 
producer of wind energy were encrypted by 
ransomware with a EUR 9.8 million ransom 
demanded (Gatlan, 2020c).
Furthermore, the coronavirus phenomenon  
was exploited by malicious mobile app coders.  
In mid-March, researchers revealed information  
on an Android ransomware called CovidLock  
which masquerades as a Coronavirus information 
tracker with the aim of locking the victim’s 
smartphone until they accept to pay a ransom.
Overall, within a matter of weeks, ransomware 
attacks had increased by almost 150 % above 
the baseline levels in February 2020 (Upatham 
and Treinen, 2020). A recent ENISA report 
(ENISA, 2020b) on COVID-19 threats observed 
that the behaviour of cyber criminals had also 
changed, noting in particular that the time 
between infecting a system with ransomware 
and activation of the attack had fallen as cyber 
criminals attempted to maximise profits  
in the short term.
 6.3. Critical infrastructures  
 and services
Already under pressure from coping with  
the pandemic, health systems have been 
relentlessly attacked throughout this period. 
According to WHO’s chief information officer,  
there were five times more security incidents 
targeting the organisation than during the same 
period in 2019 (Asokan, 2020). In fact, WHO  
has been the target of endless cyber attacks  
since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic  
(Ahmed, 2020).
One of the main testing facilities in Czechia,  
the Brno University Hospital, had to shut down  
its computers due to a cybersecurity incident  
on 13 March (Porter, 2020). A week later,  
Spanish police sent out an alert of a cyber attack 
targeting Spanish hospitals via a CoVID-19-
themed malware (Dolz and Colomé, 2020).  
On 22 March, the Assistance Publique - Hôpitaux 
de Paris was targeted by a DoS attack (Fouquet, 
2020), while on 27 March, the same kind  
of attack was launched against a consortium  
of hospitals in Europe. On 22 March, Ambry 
Genetics, a California-headquartered genetic 
testing laboratory reported an email hacking 
incident that may have exposed medical 
information on nearly 233 000 clients  
(McGee, 2020).
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According to reports (Klöckner, Olk, and Rybicki, 
2020), early in April, German public health minister 
Jens Spahn was the recipient of a ransom note 
entitled ‘Attack on German hospitals’, demanding 
EUR 25 million. In another April incident,  
the website of the Italian National Institute for 
Social Security suffered a DoS attack (Amante, 
2020). On 1 April, the Russian state-owned 
telecom provider Rostelecom was involved in 
a major hijacking incident, when traffic routes 
intended for servers from Google, Amazon, 
Facebook and other cloud-hosting providers  
were diverted to Russian networks. On 20 April, 
COVID-19-themed attacks reportedly targeted  
the energy sector in Azerbaijan (Lakshmanan, 
2020a). The scam uses MS Word documents 
as droppers to deploy a remote access trojan 
with the aim of exfiltrating sensitive documents, 
passwords, keystrokes, and others.
On 27 April, IT security researchers at Cyble, 
announced (Asif, 2020a) that it had identified 
hackers who had attacked Huiying Medical,  
a Chinese company with a worldwide presence.  
A raft of data, including information on COVID-19 
experiments, was stolen, some of which have  
been spotted for sale on the dark web. 
A recent CERT-EU cyber bulletin noted that no  
new COVID-19-related DoS attacks had been 
observed since 22 April (CERT-EU, 2020a). 
Nevertheless, on 30 April, the EU foreign policy 
chief Josep Borrell condemned the exploitation  
of the COVID-19 pandemic to launch cyber attacks 
on infrastructure and healthcare services (Council 
of the European Union, 2020).
 6.4. State-sponsored actors
State-sponsored actors have also adapted 
their activities during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Research institutions working in areas related to 
the pandemic have become targets of interest 
of state-sponsored actors seeking strategic 
advantage (CERT-EU, 2020b; 2020c). Fake news 
is another field where state-sponsored actors 
have become more active. In mid-March, the US 
Department of Health’s IT systems were thought 
to have been attacked by a foreign actor (Stein 
and Jacobs, 2020). 
Such attacks have been observed across  
the globe over the last few months and with 
varying motives. In March, a Pakistan-based threat  
actor dispatched a phishing email with a link 
to a malicious document imitating the Indian 
government (Cybersecurity Help, 2020b), while 
a campaign against the Mongolian public sector 
was also reported (Atlas Cybersecurity, 2020). 
According to reports (Panda, 2020), Vietnamese 
state-backed hackers launched campaigns against 
Chinese targets between January and April in 
order to collect intelligence on the COVID-19 crisis. 
In April, the Centre for Cyber Security in Denmark 
published a threat assessment (Centre for Cyber 
Security, 2020) warning of a very elevated threat 
from cyber espionage and cybercrime.  
While scientists worldwide have been racing  
to develop a COVID-19 vaccine, the USA has 
observed foreign spy agencies carrying out 
reconnaissance of coronavirus-related research 
(Corera, 2020; Barth, 2020). Due to the pandemic,  
there is also a growing concern that the US 
   Research 
institutions  
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areas related to  
the pandemic  
have become the focus 
of interest for state-
sponsored actors.
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elections in November 2020 will be more 
vulnerable to outside interference (Miller, 2020).
 6.5. Advanced persistent threats
Since COVID-19 was declared a pandemic, 
different types of phishing scams have been used 
by cyber criminals in an attempt to maximise 
their profits by preying on the fear of the virus. 
APT threat actors have also sought to exploit 
the pandemic via spear-phishing campaigns 
and watering-hole strategies, amongst others. 
According to Kaspersky’s APT trends report  
Q1 2020 (GReAT, 2020), the list of attackers also 
included APT threat actors who, according to Open-
source intelligence (OSINT), used COVID-19-themed 
traps to target their victims. Kaspersky reported 
the discovery of a suspicious infrastructure to 
health and humanitarian organisations, including 
the WHO. In addition, according to Malwarebytes 
researchers (Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence 
Team, 2020a), from late January, several cyber 
criminal and state-sponsored APT groups have 
used coronavirus-based phishing as their main 
infection vector to launch malware attacks. China 
was the first to be lined up as a target by APT 
groups, and as the virus spread worldwide, so did 
the attacks. Other recent reports (Dean Russell, 
2020) highlighted that some APTs have capitalised 
on fake news, ‘online trolls’, and fake social 
media accounts to undermine other countries by 
spreading distrust and panic.
 6.6. Data protection
Several countries, particularly in Europe, have 
made considerable efforts to develope contact 
tracing tools to curb the COVID-19 pandemic while 
also balancing privacy concerns. According to 
CERT-EU (CERT-EU, 2020a), as of 29 April,  
at least 43 countries globally had adopted or  
were currently testing surveillance technologies. 
The data typically stem from seven sources: mobile 
providers, smartphone apps, wearable devices 
like electronic wristbands, public cameras, facial 
recognition, aerial surveillance, and credit cards.
In addition, governments in several countries 
outsource data collection and data analytics to 
private companies or institutes, thereby creating 
additional risks of personal data abuse and 
privacy breaches. Attempts to safeguard privacy 
are diverse among countries. Four key criteria 
appear to be specifically relevant: grouped, 
anonymised surveillance versus individualised 
surveillance combined with identification; opt-
in versus mandatory surveillance; degree of 
combination of several technologies; and the 
status of personal data protection regulations, 
such as the EU’s GDPR. A characteristic example 
of this situation was the approval of emergency 
measures by the Israeli government for its security 
agencies to track the mobile phone data of 
people with suspected coronavirus (Tidy, 2020b). 
Bahrein and Hong Kong have also employed 
tracker wristbands to geo-fence individuals under 
compulsory home quarantine.
Another key issue of concern is the amount  
of data major tech companies, possess.  
   At least  
43 countries have 
either adopted 
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testing contact tracing 
technologies with 
the aim of curbing 
the COVID-19 
pandemic.
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These giants are aware of individuals’ whereabouts 
and habits and can profile them in the mid or long 
term. Although, if provided to authorities, such 
pieces of data can help in curbing the pandemic, 
the approach may create a negative privacy 
precedent, turning emergency contact tracing into 
a so-called ‘new normal’. 
On 9 April, the US National Law Review published 
an article offering privacy and cybersecurity 
regulatory and enforcement guidance around 
COVID-19 (Goldstick et al., 2020). In early April, 
a plethora of civil society groups signed a joint 
statement, enumerating several conditions 
for those governments currently using digital 
surveillance to fight the pandemic (Human Rights 
Watch, 2020). A similar list of principles for 
protecting civil and political rights in the fight 
against COVID-19 were published by the Freedom 
House (Freedom House, 2020) on March 24. 
According to Reuters (Busvine and Rinke, 2020), 
Germany altered its position on the centralisation 
of data generated by COVID-19-tacking mobile 
apps, opting for a decentralised approach to digital 
contact tracing, thereby abandoning a home-grown 
alternative that would have allegedly given health 
authorities central control over the tracing data. 
Large- or medium-scale surveillance COVID-19-
inspired campaigns also became the focus of 
cyber criminals. During the second half of March, 
Lookout! researchers discovered a malicious 
Android app called ‘corona live 1.1.’. This app,  
a trojanised version of the legitimate ‘corona live’ 
app, appeared to be the most recent addition to 
the arsenal of a mobile surveillance campaign 
targeting Libyan individuals (Del Rosso, 2020).  
On 13 April, it was reported (Cyber Report, 2020) 
that the QR-code-based system that allowed 
Moscow citizens to generate permits for leaving 
their home was hacked while in beta-testing.  
For the sake of avoiding security by obscurity,  
the source code of a mobile app proposed to  
the Netherlands government to trace COVID-19 
was publicly released. Developers were surprised 
to find that the source files contained user data 
stemming from another app (Osborne, 2020).  
In another similar case, a voluntary Bluetooth-
based COVID-19 tracing app introduced by  
the Australian government falsely alerted users 
who were not tested for COVID-19 that they might 
be infected (Coble, 2020).
 6.7. Cryptocurrencies and money mules
On 19 March, Coindesk announced (Hertig, 
2020) that thousands of mining cryptocurrency 
machines were diverted to coronavirus research in 
cooperation with Stanford University in California. 
Specifically, CoreWeave redirected the processing 
power of 6 000 specialised computer chips towards 
research to find a therapy for the coronavirus. 
On the downside, with many people unemployed 
or working from home due to the COVID-19 
crisis, cyber criminals have been able to recruit 
many more ‘money mules’, namely, individuals 
who engage in money-laundering schemes 
under the premise of a work-at-home job offer 
(Krebs, 2020a). There were reports in Canada 
and the USA of money mules being recruited for 
a supposed COVID-19 foundation called ‘Vasty 
Health Care Foundation’. Under this subterfuge, 
after completing a non-suspicious work-related 
task, individuals were asked to process donations 
in aid of fighting the virus. The mules received  
a specific amount into their bank accounts  
and could keep a portion with the remainder 
deposited in a Bitcoin ATM.
 6.8. E-commerce marketplaces  
 and the dark web
Cyber criminals and online opportunists have 
continued to prey on the public’s vulnerability 
during the pandemic. They have sold counterfeit 
medical masks, fake treatments and cures on 
e-commerce marketplaces and social media 
platforms (Heilweil, 2020). According to Europol, 
the number of products which claim to treat 
or cure infection by coronavirus has increased 
sharply since the onset of the pandemic. 
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Scammers have requested upfront payment for 
such items, with buyers paying then not receiving 
the goods. The latest Europol reports stress that 
other types of scams, such as home-test kits or 
investments and donations related COVID-19, 
have also been detected. In fact, new variations 
of these COVID-19-themed scams are appearing 
daily, although as the pandemic recedes the 
number of such incidents is expected to decline 
over time.
The pandemic has also had a considerable impact 
on dark web operations. Given the shortages in 
source materials or special healthcare products, 
illicit goods have become more expensive. In many 
cases, fake and even dangerous coronavirus-
related products have been offered at steep 
discounts (Bizga, 2020). Prominent examples of 
such products are personal protective equipment 
and home-care ventilators. An April report (Asif, 
2020b) from HackRead.com noted that MP3 files 
‘with a special frequency’ were being sold on  
the dark web with the claim that listening to  
them three to six times a day could help annihilate 
COVID-19. No less important, according to 13 April 
reports (Abrams, 2020a), half a million Zoom  
app accounts were put up for sale on the dark 
web. In fact, Cyble sent an alert that already  
by 1 April, free Zoom accounts were being posted 
on hacker forums.
 6.9. Teleworking
In early April, CERT-EU reported how the 
COVID-19 crisis had resulted in a staggering 
number of employees working from home 
with a corresponding increase in the use of 
videoconferencing and chat apps, including Zoom, 
Slack, Skype, WebEx, Google Meet, and Microsoft 
Teams. While several vulnerabilities related to 
such apps were identified, a considerable number 
have affected Zoom (Hodge, 2020a; 2020b; 
Sebenius and Mehrotra, 2020). Also, in mid-April,  
a significant vulnerability was found to affect  
the Mail app on the iOS platform (Zecops Research 
Team, 2020). On 19 April, the US Cybersecurity 
and Infrastructure Security Agency announced 
that two separate attacks targeted as many as  
50 000 different MS Teams users, with the purpose 
of phishing Office 365 logins (CISA, 2020a).
 
In this context, the cybersecurity protection of 
the smart home is of paramount importance 
(Europol, 2020a). ENISA describes a set of 
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recommendations for both employers and staff  
to maintain an adequate level of cybersecurity 
when teleworking (ENISA, 2020c). In 30 April,  
the Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection 
(ATP) research team announced the addition of 
new COVID-19-tagged assessments to their Threat 
and Vulnerability Management (Mittelman, 2020). 
The need for social distancing, while maintaining 
close and everyday contact with other team 
members and stakeholders, has resulted in  
a massive uptake of cloud-based communication 
tools. In this accelerated uptake of cloud services,  
it is of the utmost importance to protect personal  
and business online identities by using strong 
passwords and even stronger forms of 
authentication (i.e. 2-factor authentication).  
The JRC has presented clear advice on how to 
choose strong passwords and to manage them 
securely (Joint Research Centre, 2019). 
According to various recent reports, as VPN  
usage soared (Palmer, 2020), so did the number  
of poor (Scheels, 2020), exposed or vulnerable 
VPN services (Reynolds, 2020). In March,  
Europol (Europol, 2020a) stressed out that 
cybercrooks deploy fake VPNs to try to get access 
to mobile and personal devices, which now might 
contain company data too. No less important, 
on 24 April, the US National Security Agency 
published a comparative security assessment 
of current mainstream videoconferencing, text 
chatting, and collaboration tools (National Security 
Agency, 2020).
 6.10. Disinformation campaigns, 
 ‘infodemic’, conspiracy theories,  
 and scammers
The increased use of digital and online services 
goes beyond the business dimension. A myriad  
of European citizens confined to their homes have 
depended almost exclusively on television, radio, 
social media, and instant messaging platforms  
to interact with society and stay informed of  
the rapidly evolving situation. 
Adversaries have taken advantage of this situation 
by targeting society with disinformation campaigns 
and phishing attacks connected to the COVID-19 
theme. This topic falls under the umbrella term 
‘anti-democracy attacks and cyber influencing’, 
including fake news, cyber meddling, and 
astroturfing. ‘We’re not just fighting an epidemic; 
we’re fighting an infodemic. Fake news spreads 
faster and more easily than this virus, and is just 
as dangerous,’ said WHO Director-General at the 
Munich Security Conference on 15 February (World 
Health Organization, 2020). In contrast to closely 
policed platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, 
old-school text message campaigns, for example, 
via SMS or pivate WhatsApp and Messenger chats, 
spread COVID-19 fake news more easily. Many of 
the misinformation campaigns triggered relate to 
the capacities of national or regional authorities  
to deal with the crisis (CERT-EU, 2020a).  
During this time, conspiracy theories, which try 
to satisfy a need for accuracy and knowledge, 
have proliferated, such as linking 5G technology 
to the pandemic (Gallagher, 2020) or others that 
fuel anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment 
(Krishnan, 2020).  
   The unprecedented 
adoption of 
teleworking schemes 
is clearly impacting  
the legacy schemes used 
to protect businesses  
and institutions.
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Even though there have been numerous examples 
of fake news linked to COVID-19, it is still not clear 
if they are the result of a targeted campaign. 
Newly introduced blockchain-based schemes that 
help the readership to check the origin of news is a 
step in the right direction. On 6 April, Italy’s leading 
news agency ANSA announced ANSAcheck,  
a unique news-tracking system based on 
blockchain technology to enable readers to check 
the origin of news on their platforms (ANSA, 2020). 
Email, SMS, instant messaging platforms,  
and even mobile and wireline connections have 
all been heavily exploited as phishing vectors. 
According to reports (Daly, 2020) dated 2 April, 
Russian scammers disseminated two different 
phishing emails impersonating President Donald  
Trump. The first was about an extended quarantine  
and an adjusted IRS tax deadline, while the other 
shared steps to slow the spread of the virus.  
In another announcement (ACCC, 2020), dated 
6 April, Australian citizens were targeted by 
scammers attempting to steal superannuation 
funds partially released due to the COVID-19 crisis. 
In mid-April, reports (Cimpanu, 2020b) revealed 
that the local government of North Rhine-
Westphalia in Germany may have lost millions  
of euros after it failed to build a secure website  
for distributing coronavirus emergency aid funding. 
As of 26 April (Waqas, 2020), it was reported that 
scammers were posing as WHO representatives  
to solicit donations. 
 6.11. E-education and minors
The hasty major adoption of distance education 
in educational institutions of all levels also 
highlighted cybersecurity and data protection risks, 
including phishing attacks, ransomware, extortion, 
exposure to inappropriate content, unsafe sharing 
of personal data, and cyberbullying. In March,  
it was reported that minors were being 
targeted with pornography during hacked Zoom 
conversations (Mail Online, 2020). According to 
    A pandemic  
easily leads to  
an ‘infodemic’.
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CERT-EU, e-learning infrastructure, online classes, 
food delivery services or public health issues 
information websites in Europe were affected 
by DoS attacks in March. Furthermore, in other 
extortion cases, cyber criminals have claimed to 
know details and secrets of their victims’ lives by 
infecting their computers. Not only was financial 
compensation requested in order not to disclose 
sensitive information, threats were also made to 
infect the victims’ families with coronavirus. 
Medium- and long-term data protection 
implications could also be foreseen. Distance 
learning based on Internet platforms creates 
new spaces where children’s data are generated, 
exchanged, and stored. Some of these spaces 
belong to the personal and private sphere, 
and sometimes the system pushes users to 
share them. This could easily lead to an unsafe 
oversharing of personal information with 
implications for cybersecurity and data protection 
for both parents and children. In a report in late 
March, Europol (Europol, 2020b) noted a strong 
indication of greater online activity by those 
seeking child-abuse material.
 6.12. Takeaways
The pandemic is a new reality and affects us 
all. Nevertheless, as the worldwide fight against 
COVID-19 unfolds, the cybersecurity community 
will come under further pressure as cybercrooks 
and wily opportunists have proven to be adept  
and agile in envisioning modus operandi  
and mixing old-school tools along with novel  
ones to harness major crises.
New or mutated pandemic-themed malware, 
ransomware, scams, and frauds will emerge.  
The dread and panic the pandemic has inflicted 
may entice even tech- and security-savvy people 
to, unconsciously or otherwise, disregard risks  
and fall for fraudsters and cyber criminals.  
In addition to legacy defensive measures, this 
situation urgently calls for awareness-raising, 
particularly as large-scale and prolonged 
teleworking, online shopping, online education,  
and other societal seismic shifts are almost  
certain to remain elevated in the future.
Governments have rushed to devise or embrace 
novel contact tracing mechanisms and monitoring 
systems to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Several of these systems exploit real-time 
positioning data from cellular networks or utilise 
facial recognition and other mainstream tech.  
In this context, and for the sake of safeguarding 
basic freedoms, policymakers must ensure that 
any surveillance system complies with human 
rights principles while allowing the authorities to 
do what is essential to safeguard public health. 
   The pandemic 
is a new reality 
which is affecting 
the modus vivendi 
of the international 
community.
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SUMMARY
Since cybersecurity risks cannot be completely eliminated, how can they be mitigated? 
Cooperation, knowledge and timely communication regarding the threats and how 
to face them is an important step forward. Education is of equal importance, both 
for end-users and for industries: cultivating a security-conscious approach with tech-
niques such as security-by-design and security-by-default help to deal with the risk 
at an early stage. However, cyber attacks will still take place. Therefore, it is crucial 
to be ready to face them with the lowest impact possible on the overall system, i.e. 
to demonstrate cyber resilience. Effective mitigation should concern all three above- 
mentioned risk aspects.
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CYBERSECURITY 
RISK MITIGATION 
STRATEGIES
The fundamental question cybersecurity is facing 
every day is how to tame and mitigate the overall 
growing cybersecurity risk. The challenge lies  
in setting up strategies to effectively manage  
and control such risks. Below we give an overview 
of the most relevant measures. 
 7.1. Deter threat actors
Conceptually speaking, cybercrime is not that  
different from traditional crime. Cybersecurity  
risk can therefore be mitigated by acting on  
the threat-actor element of the risk equation  
with measures specifically aimed at discouraging 
malicious actions.
This is precisely the goal of the deterrence 
strategy behind cybercrime laws and efforts of 
law-enforcement bodies to prosecute cybercrime. 
This is easier said than done as cybercrime poses 
specific challenges to law-enforcement agencies.
 7.1.1 Cooperation between  
 law-enforcement authorities  
 and other stakeholders
Today, cybersecurity must be approached from  
a global perspective. Increasing effective 
cooperation amongst law-enforcement authorities 
from different Member States is necessary to 
address the rapid global evolution of cybercrime. 
The cybersecurity community is highly 
internationalised and criminal threat actors  
are increasingly organised in complex networks 
spread all over the world with capabilities to react 
in real time, adapting their attacks and concealing 
their digital traces. 
Cooperation amongst law enforcement in this 
area should also extend to the Computer Security 
Incident Response Team (CSIRT), industry  
and academic communities. Industry is usually 
the one in possession of valuable information that 
can be used as evidence to prosecute perpetrators 
of cyber attacks. The research community can 
contribute to improving and developing better 
technical means to enable effective deterrence.  
Implementing this type of cooperation is not 
always straightforward. Motivating some industry 
communities to assist law enforcement is still 
controversial in some situations and regulatory 
frameworks should specify clearly who can access 
All the cybersecurity 
risk dimensions  
must be mitigated  
by taking the  
appropriate and  
effective measures.
user information and when. For example, in  
the case of a company where the main added 
value lies in its security and privacy practices,  
such collaboration with law enforcement could  
be perceived by its customers as a negative 
element. This situation may change as end-users’ 
attitudes to cooperation in the fight against cyber-
enabled crime evolve. 
Wide cross-border collaboration is fundamental 
considering that the concept of international 
borders in the cyber world is almost non-existent. 
The cross-border dimension is the norm in cyber 
attacks, both because perpetrators and victims 
are often located in several countries and because 
resources dispersed on a global scale are usually 
used to conduct cyber attacks. 
Agile collaboration among law enforcers is of 
paramount importance as it can boost their 
capacities to investigate and prosecute such cases 
efficiently and bring the perpetrators to justice.  
The activities of Europol and Interpol in this field  
are encouraging examples of international efforts  
in this direction.
 7.1.2 Cyber threat intelligence
Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is a technical  
term unifying approaches and techniques for  
the collection of intelligence of various kinds  
(i.e. open source, social media, technical, etc.) 
related to cyber criminal activities. CTI can 
collectively contribute to risk mitigation at many 
levels. The most natural one is by providing 
valuable information that can assist law enforcers 
in identifying the perpetrators of a given cyber 
attack. Indeed, it is often the case that there is  
no direct link between the threat actor behind  
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    The concept 
of international 
borders in  
the cyber world is  
almost non-existent.
a cyber attack, the computer system compromised 
and the location of the subsequent impact.  
Attributing cyber attacks to the threat actors  
who initiated them not only contributes to the 
prosecution of the attacks but also to improving 
preparedness to prevent future cyber attacks by 
identifying trends and analysing the technical  
and organisational means used to implement  
and conduct such attacks. It can also help to deter 
them by naming and shaming perpetrators. 
All this information can complement the 
knowledge of law enforcers, cybersecurity 
professionals and researchers, thereby helping 
them to keep pace with the rapidly changing  
cyber threat ecosystem. As a result, they can  
be better prepared to assess cybersecurity risks, 
anticipate potential cyber attacks, and design  
and implement more effective countermeasures.  
 7.1.3 Reporting cyber attack cases
The timely reporting of actual and potential cyber 
attacks is extremely relevant as it is the key step 
in triggering prosecution.  
Companies that fall victim to cyber attackers  
often hesitate to formally report it because of  
the perceived potential negative impact on  
the trust of their customers and public opinion. 
Cyber attacks directly impacting individuals  
are also usually left unreported by victims,  
who may either be unaware of the right process  
to follow to report this type of incident or  
simply fail to understand the importance  
of reporting them. 
 
It is easy to see some parallels here with  
the well-known ‘broken windows theory’  
in traditional criminology. Originally proposed  
in 1982 (Wilson and Kelling, 1982), this  
theory states that when a community or 
ecosystem becomes used to criminal events, 
no matter the scale, and this type of event 
proliferates without any action taken to remedy  
the situation, further criminal events are implicitly 
incentivised and tend to escalate in magnitude 
and frequency19.  
When applied to cybersecurity, the broken window 
theory not only refers to the reporting of crimes 
and their prosecution but more generally to  
the community’s engagement in collaborating  
and standing against this type of event. Any cyber 
incident should therefore be reported and handled 
as much as possible to better grasp the current 
situation about cybercrime as well as transmit 
a message that no crime is deliberately left 
unaccounted for and unpunished. 
This approach requires that citizens have 
access to, and are aware of, existing reporting 
mechanisms and that companies collaborate  
in reporting cyber incidents, as is the case in 
the data protection domain with the mandatory 
reporting of personal data breaches following 
the GDPR. Steps in this direction are also taken 
in the cases of cybersecurity incidents affecting 
essential digital service providers, including critical 
infrastructure (see the NIS Directive (European 
Commission, 2016c) and Cybersecurity Act 
(European Commission, 2017d)) and trust service 
providers (eIDAS regulation) (European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union, 2014).
 7.1.4 Innovative techniques  
 to fight cybercrime
The prosecution of cybercrime crucially depends 
on the capabilities of law enforcement to gather 
evidence, attribute attacks to their origin, analyse 
the crime and eventually bring perpetrators to 
justice. All of this constitutes increasing technical 
challenges due to the evolving technological 
landscape and, thus, to the means employed 
by cyber attackers to carry out their attacks. 
One striking example of obvious relevance to 
prosecution concerns the difficulties encountered 
in dealing with cyber criminals’ increased use  
of encryption and anonymisation techniques,  
as previously pointed out.  
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On a broader scale, digital services, automation 
and AI techniques for labour-intensive tasks have 
become a new playground for both cybercrime  
and law enforcement.  
In the long run, these developments not only  
assist law enforcement in the investigation of 
cybercrime but also in traditional forms of crime 
where digital content can also play a key role  
in the investigation. 
Apart from the growing arsenal of tools attached 
to the aforementioned AI-driven cyber threat 
analysis, the most prevalent examples come 
from the wide fields of big data analytics, data 
mining and data visualisation, digital forensics 
and biometrics used for criminal investigative 
purposes. This encompasses very different 
applications, ranging from computer and hard-
drive forensics, fraud detection in large databases, 
audio or image content analytics, social media 
filtering, personal identification techniques, 
automated surveillance or the early identification 
if criminal behaviour from predictive modelling.
 7.2. Mitigating vulnerabilities
The exploitation of vulnerabilities is a crucial  
and necessary step in every cyber attack. In most 
cases, vulnerabilities exploited in such attacks are 
either of a technical nature (i.e. weaknesses in the 
software/hardware), human, or a combination of 
both. Whereas in many cases it is in the technical 
dimension, we should not forget that the human 
element is largely considered to be the weakest 
link in the security chain and must be properly 
addressed in risk-mitigation strategies (Sasse, 
Brostoff and Weirich, 2001).
A classical strategy to reduce cybersecurity risk 
involves deploying measures aimed at mitigating 
vulnerabilities, regardless of their nature.  
In the following subsections, we present key 
strategies to act on the vulnerability dimension  
of the cybersecurity risk. 
It is important to understand that none of these 
strategies can be sufficiently effective when 
considered in isolation. Indeed, the principle 
of defence in depth (also known as the castle 
approach) states that multiple complementary 
countermeasures should be deployed in layers 
to exploit the overall effectiveness of their 
combination. This principle, which is clearly 
illustrated by the analogy of the castle with  
its surrounding moat and system of walls, is 
one of the main driving principles in the design 
of a cybersecurity strategy aimed at mitigating 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
 7.2.1 Research and innovation  
 in the cybersecurity industry
A wide range of products already exists20 with 
proven efficacy in mitigating certain cybersecurity 
risks by identifying and preventing attacks. 
Cybersecurity products are assets in the arsenal 
of weapons that can be deployed to manage 
cybersecurity risk.
As the technical means used by cyber attackers 
to conduct attacks and their modus operandi 
continue to evolve, constant research and 
innovation are required in the cybersecurity 
industry to keep up with this evolution and develop 
more advanced and effective solutions. 
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 7.2.2 Security-by-design and by-default  
 in digital products and services
Security-by-design and security-by-default21 
are important guiding principles in cybersecurity. 
They are ultimately oriented towards the goal of 
reducing vulnerabilities in digital systems, services 
and processes.  
The effective application of the security-by- 
design principle implies that non-functional 
security requirements are identified early in 
 the development life cycle of new products  
and services and are properly prioritised with 
respect to functional ones. In industry, the main 
problem in the practical application of this 
principle lies precisely in the need to prioritise 
security requirements, which are often perceived 
as non-essential by industry as they are not  
seen as direct contributors to building value  
in the end product.  
Possible incentives to remedy this situation include 
the introduction of cybersecurity requirements 
in regulations applicable to the development 
of products and services. In particular, liability 
regulations for products and services could further 
incorporate cybersecurity aspects. This would 
motivate industry to follow secure-by-design 
and by-default principles in the development 
of services and products. A similar approach 
has been adopted by the GDPR, whereby data 
controllers and data processors can be subjected 
to substantial fines if they fail to comply with  
the regulation on the protection of personal data. 
This initiative could be complemented by offering 
users and companies in specific domains economic 
incentives to provide more secure products.  
An analogy can be made with tax incentives for 
electric vehicles in some countries (Figenbaum, 
Assum and Kolbenstvedt, 2015). 
Technology also has a role to play in enabling 
the practical application of security-by-design 
principles. Operating systems and compilers have 
increasingly embedded countermeasures against 
entire classes of long-lived vulnerabilities.  
New generations of programming languages have 
been specifically designed for secure software 
development that can enable a new generation  
of more secure digital infrastructure, products  
and services.
 7.2.3 Cybersecurity education
Proper dedicated skills are required to incorporate 
security along the whole development, release  
and life cycle of a service or product. 
Unfortunately, there is currently a shortage of 
dedicated professional profiles in the world,  
and thus also in the EU, which will continue to 
widen in the near future. This shortage in the 
cybersecurity workforce is expected to reach around 
3.5 million worldwide by 2021 (Burrell, 2018). 
 
In recent years, the cybersecurity-skill landscape 
has exploded into a complex ecosystem 
encompassing skill sets clustered in many different 
domains and abstraction layers. This has led to 
a specialisation in the domain of cybersecurity. 
This trend is likely to continue further due to the 
increasing digitalisation of industry and society 
and cybersecurity’s multidisciplinary nature. 
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   By 2021,  
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the cybersecurity 
workforce  
is expected to be 
around 3.5 million 
worldwide.
Certification programmes (e.g. certified information 
security manager (CISM) or certified information 
systems security professional CISSP)) are good 
indicators for qualified workers in cybersecurity.  
Promoting dedicated career training (e.g. the above- 
mentioned certifications, information security 
training, cyber ranges, etc.) is also a favoured 
approach to disseminating cyber skills. The mid-
term effect this can have is that it would empower 
anyone to improve security at their own level,  
or at least identify security weaknesses that need 
to be addressed. Indeed, to further embrace  
the principle of security-by-design and by-default, 
there is a need to embed cybersecurity skills in 
other careers and professions, such as engineering 
and medicine. 
 7.2.4 Cybersecurity certification  
 and labelling
There are many definitions for the process of 
cybersecurity certification. A definition derived 
from NIST (Ron Ross et al., 2004) states that it is 
a comprehensive assessment of the management, 
operational and technical security controls in  
an ICT system. In other words, a specific model 
and version of an ICT system is submitted to  
a rigorous testing process against specific security 
and privacy requirements before being deployed  
in the market. In this way, an ICT system can  
be assessed against known vulnerabilities or to 
fulfil specific requirements driven by a regulation  
or by users’ needs. 
Cybersecurity certification can be considered  
the first line of defence to mitigate cybersecurity 
threats. Security requirements are derived from  
a risk analysis process, based on the known 
security needs and vulnerabilities. 
Cybersecurity certification can be complemented by 
a cybersecurity label, which contains information 
that represents the value of one or more security 
attributes of the ICT system. Then, if a specific 
model and version of an ICT system successfully 
passes a cybersecurity certification process, it can 
be assigned a label. This would provide concise 
information – for example, an index to users 
detailing what security requirements the ICT 
system has. The concept of a label can be used 
to address the lack of transparency about the 
security features implemented by a manufacturer.
The concept of defining cybersecurity certification 
schemes at the European level and the label 
concept are key elements in the recently proposed 
Cybersecurity Act (European Commission, 2017d). 
However, there is still considerable work to 
do to address some aspects of cybersecurity 
certification, which are presented below.
First, even if the main security certification 
standard is the Common Criteria (CC), which 
is widely adopted worldwide, there are slightly 
different implementations in a Europe of Common 
Criteria. The SOG-IS22 agreement partly addresses 
this lack of harmonisation and the Cybersecurity 
Act supports an extension of its mandate. Another 
challenge is the cost and time needed by the CC 
certification process, which can be an obstacle  
for small companies or ICT products requiring  
a rapid time to market (as in the IoT domain).  
To mitigate this challenge, more efficient 
certification processes for specific categories of 
ICT products have been proposed, like the French 
Certification de Sécurité de Premier Niveau (CSPN) 
which uses limited-time black-box testing.
A timely and cost-effective cybersecurity 
certification process is required in particular when 
an ICT product (model and version) is subjected 
to an update/modification. Software updates 
are often needed in modern ICT systems to add 
new features and improvements. In many cases, 
they are also needed to address new security 
vulnerabilities. Zero-day attacks or vulnerabilities 
discovered after the initial evaluation and 
deployment on the market may require redrafting 
the Protection Profiles in CC and the application 
of a new re-evaluation process. If there are 
major changes, a re-evaluation is needed, which 
can be a considerable burden for an ICT vendor. 
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Subsequently, research and standardisation efforts 
could be directed at more effective and automated 
cybersecurity certification processes for both  
the initial evaluation and the re-evaluation  
process (Matheu-García et al., 2018).
 7.2.5 Vulnerability management
Despite the best efforts in following security-
by-default and security-by-design principles, 
vulnerabilities are likely to be discovered  
over time. It is important to prepare for those 
events by developing an effective strategy  
for the management of vulnerabilities during  
the life cycle of digital services and products. 
The time elapsed between the discovery of  
a vulnerability in a given product or service and  
the release and deployment of security patches 
or a fix to address it is critical. This time frame 
defines the window of opportunity for threat actors 
to exploit that vulnerability to conduct a cyber 
attack. The security risk quickly arises when  
the vulnerability is discovered, evolves during 
this time frame, and only declines to previous 
levels when all vulnerable systems have been 
patched. It is worth noting that for some widespread 
vulnerabilities it could take years to reach that point.
Those vulnerabilities that have been discovered 
but remain unknown to the manufacturer, who 
therefore cannot address them, deserve particular 
attention. They are known as zero-days and are  
of significant value for all interested parties,  
the threat actors seeking to exploit them,  
and parties involved in cybersecurity protection  
(e.g. manufacturers) that want to fix them. 
 
Vulnerabilities, and in particular zero-day ones, are 
sold and bought openly on the market. Their value 
depends on the importance of the vulnerability, and 
the type of client buying it (threat actors, vendors, 
intermediaries, etc.).
Indeed, proper management of vulnerabilities 
during the entire life cycle of a digital product  
or infrastructure is key to ensuring continuous  
and homogeneous cybersecurity coverage of 
digital systems and infrastructures. Initiatives 
should be extensively encouraged to cover  
the early discovery of vulnerabilities, the timely 
release of proper fixes, and the accurate  
and planned installation of the related patches. 
Bounty programs and platforms are put in 
place by manufacturers and other interested 
parties, with the aim of identifying and fixing 
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vulnerabilities (Householder et al., 2017; Schaake 
et al., 2018). These types of programs are also 
referred to as white markets. Unfortunately, threat 
agents also act at this level, creating a black 
market of vulnerabilities that typically pays up to 
10 times more than the white market (Schneier, 
2019b; Ablon and Bogart, 2017), mainly because 
they trade in functional exploits rather than simply 
knowledge of them. 
The vulnerabilities identified, either by a program 
or any other means (e.g. research community), are 
traditionally fixed through security patch/updates 
of the underlying software or by a replacement 
program where a local update is not feasible. 
Unfortunately, this critical process is not always 
performed well in practice.
For example, deploying patches and security 
updates for IoT devices still faces significant 
challenges. Many IoT devices (e.g. small sensors  
or actuators) lack a user interface to facilitate  
the installation of patches, or users are simply  
not provided with the proper means to manage  
the deployment of security updates. 
Difficulty in deploying the update may also pose 
a problem. In the case of industry, installation of 
a new patch could require stopping the industrial 
process, which may not be possible on demand or 
could imply huge costs. Moreover, the deployment 
of the patch itself is not exempt from risks  
(i.e. the deployment of the patch might have 
undesirable side effects) and it has non-negligible 
costs for both the manufacturer of the vulnerable 
software and the user. For this reason,  
the definition of corporate patching strategies 
must be put in place at all levels.
 7.3. Limiting impact through  
 cyber resilience
In today’s hyperconnected digital world, 
the question is no longer whether a cyber 
attack will take place, but rather when. In this 
context, society, governments, businesses and 
organisations should hope for the best but 
prepare for the worst. Preparedness is crucial to 
effectively mitigate potential impacts and prevent 
catastrophic consequences in the event of a cyber 
attack. For this reason, the definition of a strategy 
to guarantee appropriate incident response  
and fit-for-purpose resilience is another key 
element to mitigate the effects of cyber attacks.
When speaking of ‘cyber resilience’, we are 
essentially referring to the ability of a system 
to survive as a whole under adverse cyber 
events. It could be said that cyber resilience is 
the intersection of information security, business 
continuity and organisational resilience. According 
to most definitions, cyber resilience incorporates 
the ability to prepare, withstand, recover and adapt 
to stresses, attacks or compromises on cyber 
resources (Bodeau and Graubart, 2017; Larkin  
et al., 2015; Björck et al., 2015). 
Cyber resilience can encompass ICT systems, 
entire organisations and even society as a whole. 
In the latter situation, the notion of resilience also 
encompasses a societal perspective, which links 
to society’s capacity to survive adverse influences 
from its environment and still function and continue 
to deliver societal well-being to current and future 
generations (Bodeau and Graubart, 2017).
As previously mentioned, adverse cyber events 
are either intentional or unintentional, with cyber 
attacks obviously falling into the first category. 
Similarly, strategies to increase cyber resilience 
and thereby mitigate the potential impacts of 
cyber attacks can largely be classified under two 
distinct categories. The first one encompasses all 
measures designed to ensure a fast and effective 
response to withstand and recover from cyber 
incidents. The second includes those measures and 
preparations aimed at ensuring that the system will 
still be able to operate in adverse circumstances, 
enabling it to function in degraded conditions.
Figure 27 depicts the classical development of 
events in the case of a successful cyber attack. 
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It shows a qualitative model of how system 
functionality23 can evolve over time during  
a cyber attack. The time frame of a cyber attack  
is not always as precisely defined as for other 
types of adverse events, such as natural  
disasters. Therefore, there can be a significant 
delay between the beginning of a cyber attack  
and when its impact starts to be noticed.  
This delay may be desired by threat actors,  
as in the case of APT or industrial espionage.
Accordingly, early detection of cyber attacks is 
crucial to shorten such a potential hidden threat. 
Furthermore, it also ensures that the incident 
response phase, depicted in the second frame 
of Figure 27, will start as soon as possible to 
withstand and absorb the effects of the attack. 
The next phase is the recovery which aims  
to restore normal system functionality once  
the incident is under control. A good level of  
cyber resilience helps reduce periods during  
which system functionality is degraded and 
the level to which this occurs. Resilience also 
contributes to the system’s capability to finally 
retrieve a normal level of functionality. 
In addition, the incident response should not stop 
once the attack has been countered. A long-term 
approach should be initiated to understand  
the root causes for the success of an attack  
and what measures could have improved  
the system’s overall resilience. In this way,  
it is even possible to consider that the post-
incident functionality reaches a higher level  
than before, as the system would become  
more resistant to future attacks.
 7.3.1 Rapid cybersecurity  
 incident response
Rapid incident response to a cyber attack, 
coordination and CSIRT involvement are key 
elements of cyber resilience, helping to mitigate the 
impact of the attack (European Commission, 2017b). 
No reaction is possible without detection.  
With the complexity and pervasiveness of 
our digital society, alongside the increasing 
sophistication and diversity of cyber attacks,  
it is increasingly likely that attacks are either 
detected too late or when the impact is already 
significant. Since most manual asynchronous 
checks of the logs are no longer feasible, 
automated real-time systems have to be 
employed these days, including antivirus,  
firewalls and intrusion-detection systems. 
Following detection, the aim is to react properly  
to the attack to minimise both the decline in  
system functionality and the duration of  
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Figure 27: System functionality vs. resilience-response time
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the attack so as to start the recovery phase as 
early as possible. However, simply stopping or 
isolating the attack may not be sufficient to initiate 
the recovery phase. A deep forensic analysis of 
the ICT system is typically required to identify the 
underlying mechanisms of the attack and restore 
the system to its original state. Depending on  
the complexity of the systems, this can become  
a lengthy procedure, while service downtimes have 
an ever-increasing impact in a hyperconnected 
world. It is crucial for all stakeholders to develop 
and maintain the capabilities to conduct such 
complex ICT forensics regardless of whether  
the attacked system is in a corporate setting,  
a public institution or of larger societal relevance,  
e.g. some part of the public infrastructure.
Detection, reaction and recovery can no longer 
be improvised or only start after the incident has 
occurred. Careful plans for all these activities 
must be devised and tested in advance to 
guarantee effectiveness and the shortest 
reaction time. Resources need to be allocated 
for incident-response activities. Staff must be 
properly educated to ensure they know how to 
react depending on the type of attack, and that 
they are aware of the designed continuity plan. 
Generally speaking, highly skilled chief information 
security officers and trained and aware employees 
can reduce the overall reaction time as well as 
the efficiency of the incident response. Finally, 
swift information mechanisms concerning ongoing 
attacks are needed between all players who are 
potentially involved. This is of special importance 
if the attack is on a larger scale and where  
the system involved encompasses the sovereignty 
of several national players, e.g. different EU 
Member States (European Commission, 2017b). 
 7.3.2 Resilience by design
To ensure that the system is able to operate 
continuously under adverse conditions, resilience 
must be included in its design. This is essentially 
the same approach as underlies the principle of 
security-by-design. Cyber resilience considerations 
need to be integrated, maintained and updated, 
starting from the inception phase of any system 
and continuing throughout its entire life cycle.
Consistently followed design principles and 
technology measures are available and can help  
to increase the resilience of systems. However, 
more than ever, they need to be enforced, 
standardised and followed through for today’s 
digital systems. 
Increasingly complex digital systems with many 
different connections call for diversity and a 
modular layered defence. Reliance on a single type 
of component, defence approach, or emergency 
procedure should be avoided. The best option is 
a multiple of different mechanisms, located in 
different layers of the system so that, in the case of 
a lost outer component, such as a server, the core 
system could continue to function. On a larger scale, 
for instance in critical digital infrastructure, this 
depends significantly on considerations of strategic 
autonomy, where society should avoid dependence 
on single supply chains for critical systems.  
Degraded-mode-functionality can also be achieved  
by adapting the technology of the system 
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components themselves to be more robust in 
adverse settings. Engineering should systematically 
consider the possibility of error and failures  
and offer alternative solutions in those scenarios 
rather than reinforcing a single safeguard leaving  
a system totally vulnerable when it fails.
Redundancy is a well-known key principle  
in engineering, including building in surplus  
and replicated system components together with 
back-up and fail-safe procedures. In particular  
for cyber resilience, redundancy should always  
be considered together with layered defence  
and diversity, since modern malware can often 
spread throughout homogeneously distributed 
resources (Bodeau and Graubart, 2017).
Such technological measures and remedies 
come at a cost both directly, by imposing higher 
investment costs in system design, and indirectly, 
by making the system more complex per se, 
possibly resulting in a loss of general robustness 
for a gain in resilience. These considerations need 
to be carefully weighed up and thought through.
Cyber resilience is not only a matter of engineering 
and technological system design. On the contrary, 
our society’s resilience depends crucially on 
the behaviour of the individual citizen. In fact, 
cybersecurity is prominent among concerns 
expressed by European citizens (European 
Commission, 2011; 2016a). However, their online 
behaviour reveals a general liberality in the use of 
their personal data across online services or being 
over-trusting in digital interactions. Users generally 
lack the appropriate digital competences (skills, 
attitude, knowledge) (Carretero, Vuorikari and 
Punie, 2017) to implement an appropriate degree 
of individual security. Consequently, the same lack 
of knowledge and skills reduces the individual’s 
resilience to cyber attack. 
This cyber resilience will become even more 
important as we emerge from the COVID-19 
pandemic. The huge upsurge in teleworking  
and distance learning has served to underline  
how essential such skills are for responsible  
online behaviour.
Raising awareness and improving the average 
skills in ICT while enhancing the transparency  
and usability of the technology may help to 
support a more resilient digital culture. In the 
first place, improving digital competences would 
help citizens to decrease online risks, reducing 
vulnerabilities and increasing the general level  
of cybersecurity among users. Developing  
an awareness culture would help to detect 
and withstand attacks and to take appropriate 
individual measures. This would reduce the impact 
on an individual, while collectively increasing 
the overall resilience. Improving the average 
ICT skills among users would also help to put 
in place quicker recovery mechanisms, thereby 
facilitating the restoration of a service, company, 
or infrastructure after an attack has taken place. 
In the end, a collective culture of resilience will 
also help to maintain a minimum level of trust  
in services and products, and ultimately public 
digital infrastructure.
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SUMMARY
Cybersecurity must advance alongside the technological shift to be able to guarantee 
a secure digital society. To do so, it has to utilise all six areas that have been men-
tioned throughout this report: ethics and rights, education, industry and digital ser-
vices, research, a common culture of collaboration, and governance. Each area is not 
independent or stand-alone; they are all pillars for a new era of cybersecurity which 
will take advantage of the enormous technical opportunities that new technologies 
have to offer. 
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TOWARDS A MORE 
SECURE DIGITAL 
ECOSYSTEM
With the advent of full digitalisation, our society is 
embarking on an epochal shift, which promises to 
completely change our world and our way of life. 
This shift is so deep that it is not only technological 
but also, and most importantly, cultural. 
Historically, the establishment of a security 
framework comprising policies, operating 
procedures, standards, guidelines, and systems 
governing, promoting and adding cybersecurity 
management, has been one of the most relevant 
components of this second step, acting as  
a stabiliser and guarantor for citizens’ rights  
and safety.
If we look at the digital revolution and the number 
of new technologies and new keywords appearing 
daily, it might appear that we are still in the first 
phase of cultural change. However, if we observe 
the potential impact of the threats to which 
the rapid uptake of new digital technologies is 
potentially exposing citizens, a very different 
reality emerges. In effect, the pioneering phase 
of the current changes is either being completely 
skipped today or is evolving too fast so that huge 
parts of society are taking a leap forward without 
little in the way of harmonisation or finding a new 
equilibrium for societal models.
By helping to protect citizens, products and services, 
cybersecurity can be the cornerstone of the digital  
transformation. Without the guarantees provided 
by a strong cybersecurity position, all the promises 
and advantages of the digital revolution risk 
collapsing, leaving us in a worse position  
than before.
The overarching challenge for cybersecurity is to 
help build a ‘secure digital society by design’ with 
all the implications and difficulties that this infers.
 
 8.1. Six areas of action 
We have identified six clusters of possible action 
instrumental in the design of a secure European 
digital society: 
• Ethics and rights: only by injecting ethics 
principles in the way in which cybersecurity 
will be implemented and administered will 
respect for human rights be guaranteed; 
• Education: without true expertise it will not be 
possible to implement cybersecurity principles 
correctly in every corner of the digital society;
Cybersecurity should 
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• Industry and digital services: only  
an industry fit for the cybersecurity challenge 
can hope to compete in the international arena; 
• Research: the digital world is changing 
faster than anything else, hence, only 
equally evolving research and development 
in cybersecurity will ensure that a European 
digital society is prepared for the evolution  
of technologies; 
• Common culture of collaboration: only  
a common ground in cybersecurity culture will 
allow cybersecurity measures and behaviour  
to flourish in every sector; 
• Governance: to ensure that cybersecurity 
is considered at all relevant stages in 
policymaking. A coordinated framework to 
ensure the full alignment of policy initiatives 
and actions at EU and Member-State level  
in the different domains listed so far will  
be key to assuring the harmonisation  
and homogenisation of cybersecurity  
across Europe. 
In the next part of this section, we will briefly 
explore ideas and suggested actions needed  
per identified area to quickly boost the creation  
of a secure European digital society.
 8.1.1 Ethics and rights
The current situation is awash with questions 
about fundamental rights and social norms in  
the digital age; how to properly enforce elements 
such as rights to privacy, protection of personal 
data, the freedom of expression and thought; 
and how to derive proper ethical guidelines for 
behaviour in the digital age, on a societal level 
as well as on an individual or professional level. 
All of these impact on cybersecurity, both 
fundamentally as a discipline and in practice.  
There is a long history of political discussion  
about how to balance and weigh rights, such as 
those concerning privacy and data protection,  
against some cybersecurity issues. However, 
cybersecurity as a discipline has no choice but  
to confront such issues. Thus, there is not only  
a need for open debate and eventual decisions 
on how to implement the law, but also for 
clarity, guidelines, concrete legal frameworks 
and best practices that will ensure both 
adherence to the law and ethically acceptable 
behaviour when practising cybersecurity.  
The set of concrete issues is large and constantly 
growing. Some problems are connected to 
essentially unsolved larger problems concerning 
the globalised digital era. How to implement 
cybersecurity measures combating hate speech  
or fake information campaigns without infringing 
on a citizen’s right to freedom of expression? 
How to handle grey zones in the usage and 
dissemination of technology and information that 
can potentially be misused? How can vulnerability 
disclosure policies (Schaake et al., 2018; CERT-EU; 
CIO Platform Nederland and Rabobank, 2016) – 
also known as the ‘vulnerabilities equities process’ 
debate in the USA – optimally balance the needs 
of all stakeholders? Others stem more from  
legal uncertainties of recently adapted laws,  
and especially in learning how to adapt practices 
in cybersecurity so that they comply with changing 
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laws. A prominent example is the GDPR, for which 
many best practices for experts still need to be 
established in detail. How can a clear framework 
for coordinated vulnerability disclosure be set up?  
How can the right balance be ensured in  
the processing of possible personal data necessary 
for certain cybersecurity operations? It is clear 
that all these issues require a collaborative 
effort by policymakers, legal experts, 
researchers, business leaders and cybersecurity 
experts to provide a growing sense of legal  
and ethical security.
 
 8.1.2 Lifelong education and the need  
 for public-interest technologists
There is a growing demand for skilled people in 
the field of cybersecurity to which, unfortunately, 
the job market is unable to respond. One visible 
consequence is the current 1 million shortfall in 
employees which is expected to grow in the future. 
 
A short-term answer to this problem is to 
encourage and support active workers to 
engage in a continuing education programme 
related to cybersecurity, leading, for example, 
to cybersecurity certification like those already 
recognised by the industry (e.g. CISSP or certified 
ethical hacker (CEH)). A European certification 
scheme should be designed to oversee 
professional development and therefore better 
address the type of expertise currently needed. 
The law-enforcement agencies sector is a good 
example of where continuing education and 
training on cybercrime and cybersecurity are 
key. In this context, one of the priorities of the 
Global Cybercrime Certification Project, launched 
in 2014, is to create a framework for certification 
of European cybercrime investigators and 
prosecutors by providing professional development 
in the area of transnational aspects of cybercrime.
The value of hands-on experience such as  
cyber ranges must be emphasised at all skill 
levels. By practising in more realistic environments, 
professionals gain technical insights and grasp 
challenges and solutions more readily. Experts 
benefit from such exercises by maintaining  
their knowledge and skills at a very high level. 
Such continuing professional education should be 
encouraged by companies through recognition or 
rewards, as they definitely benefit from the stronger 
cybersecurity skills among their employees.
A longer-term solution is to integrate the teaching 
of cybersecurity skills at all levels of education. 
It would serve the digital world as a whole to see 
cybersecurity becoming part of the global culture, 
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in general, and given its multifaceted nature,  
many areas of activity would benefit from  
this knowledge. In addition, this could increase  
the appeal of a career as cybersecurity expert to 
the younger members of society. There should 
also be a concerted effort to close the gender 
balance gap as women currently remain in  
the minority in the cybersecurity profession.
As a complementary benefit, an increase in 
citizens’ digital competencies is a move towards  
a more secure digital society. End-users will 
become able to recognise unsecure software  
and bad digital habits, making them fully aware  
of their associated risks. Armed with such 
knowledge, they will be in a better position to 
judge and make an informed choice as to what 
products and services they would like to use.  
The demand for these would naturally be 
stimulated, thereby creating an incentive for  
the industry to offer more and better digital 
products and services.
In addition to the above-mentioned needs,  
there is a strong demand for public-interest 
technologists in the cybersecurity domain.  
Defined by Bruce Schneier as ‘people who combine 
their technological expertise with a public-interest 
focus: by working on tech policy, by working on  
a tech project with a public benefit, or by working 
as a traditional technologist for an organisation 
with a public benefit’, such profiles are required 
across the policy spectrum wherever cybersecurity 
and policy intersect. Within the same mindset, 
the 2016 report (Freedman et al., 2016) ‘A Pivotal 
Moment – Developing a New Generation of 
Technologists for the Public Interest’, concludes: 
‘But public interest organisations are facing 
a talent pipeline crisis: there are not enough 
technologists working or interested in joining 
public interest fields to meet growing demand’.
 8.1.3 Industry of products and services
Creating incentives is important to ensure that 
industry applies security-by-design and security-
by-default principles in the development of new 
products, from their design phase and across  
their life cycle. In parallel to rewarding motivation 
– like that based on the demand from informed 
citizens for more secure products – industries 
should be penalised for breaching their obligations. 
Liability legislation should be developed for 
products and services from a cybersecurity 
perspective. A cybersecurity certification of 
processes and professional skills in cybersecurity 
(such as the ISO 27005 series) is particularly 
relevant to ensure cybersecurity activities are 
assigned to capable professionals who guarantee 
their effectiveness and take responsibility for 
undesirable outcomes. Further developments  
of such policy initiatives to establish a liability 
regime creates a strong push for industry to 
prioritise cybersecurity requirements in their 
products, services and processes.  
It is equally important to promote work on 
standardisation and recognise its importance  
in designing more secure products and services, 
anticipating future cybersecurity risks, by  
acting initially in the very early phase of their 
design. Solid and secure standards must be 
developed and applied as a strategic foundation 
to support a more secure and safer future 
ecosystem. Those standards should foresee that  
the interoperability of products and services is 
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systematically adopted by industry and enforced 
across all relevant layers of existing systems. 
Indeed, the lack of interoperability has a negative 
impact on cybersecurity as measures that are not 
interoperable across devices are often ignored  
and unnecessary dependencies are introduced 
thereby increasing risk. The definition of  
a common procurement language and codified 
service-level agreements could also greatly 
enhance the security level of product supply  
and value chains. 
Industry’s efforts should go beyond integrating 
security into a product or service. Vulnerabilities 
will always exist and the security of the underlying 
system and its users relies even more on  
the intentions, malicious or otherwise, of  
whoever is first to identify a vulnerability. 
An effective strategy is essential to manage 
vulnerabilities during the complete life cycle  
of products and services, including the shaping  
of fairly balanced vulnerability disclosure policies  
and the launching of regular bug bounty 
campaigns based, for instance, on tax incentives. 
Furthermore, effective means must be put  
in place to minimise the time between  
the discovery of a vulnerability and the release 
of security patches to fix it. Also in this context, 
making companies liable for the damage 
resulting from their security products would 
incentivise industry to improve the management 
of the vulnerability of their services and products.
 8.1.4 Improved coordination of research
If the mission of cybersecurity is that of ‘providing 
protection’ for the continuously evolving digital 
society, it is obvious that it must also evolve  
at the same speed or even faster to be able 
to anticipate threats which may arise, thereby 
necessitating further research in the field.
In 2018, the impact assessment conducted on 
the setting up of the European Cybersecurity 
Industrial, Technology and Research Competence 
Centre and the Network of National Coordination 
Centres provides a detailed and complex picture 
of the situation. In general, this assessment shows 
a research community vibrant, productive, and 
recognised worldwide. However, two concerns raised 
are the lack of critical mass in some research fields 
and the lack of industrial collaboration.
The lack of a strong European cybersecurity 
industry further underlines the need for 
intervention in this area. The urgency is to 
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improve the magnitude of technology  
and innovation transfer to the market using 
research project outputs. This is also an extremely 
relevant critical issue from a European strategic 
autonomy perspective since it introduces  
a dependency on products and services not 
available in the EU’s internal market.
These difficulties probably have their origins in:  
(1) the systemic lack of resources; (2) different 
priority agendas at the level of public investments 
across Member States; (3) the poor incentives  
for private investments in cybersecurity research  
and innovation; and (4) the shortage of advanced 
skills in the sector. As regards these last 
considerations, new EU measures for better 
coordination and cooperation must be defined.  
There is also a need for better coordination of 
cybersecurity research funding across the EU  
to ensure focus areas are properly addressed  
and not fragmented across many different 
research projects. For example, the funding 
strategy should support the sharing of highly 
expensive infrastructures, as in the European  
Open Laboratory initiative. Finally, cooperation 
among funding bodies and recipients on  
the co-design of research plans is needed to 
ensure relevant cybersecurity research areas  
are effectively taken into consideration.
 8.1.5 A common culture of collaboration  
 in cybersecurity
Companies, governments, organisations and,  
more broadly, citizens need to embrace a culture 
of cybersecurity. Cross-fertilisation among all 
these groups would make the difference in leading 
the digital society to another level of safety.  
For example, the connections between 
cybersecurity, privacy and data protection offer 
synergies that should be exploited in order to 
benefit from common goals, optimise resources 
and maximise the effectiveness of actions. 
Cross-fertilisation can also lead to better-trained 
professionals and more educated and aware users 
able to recognise and understand the intricate 
interdependencies that exist between them, 
ultimately leading to safer digital products  
and services and a healthier online ecosystem. 
One of the key elements promoting this 
cybersecurity community is reinforced 
information management and sharing among 
all the sub-communities. Knowledge is crucial in 
cybersecurity; one explicit example is cyber threat 
intelligence which aims to gather information 
from all possible means to better tailor mitigation 
techniques and resilience mechanisms. Clearly, 
to be effective, cyber threat intelligence requires 
access to the maximum of knowledge, currently 
maintained mainly within their corresponding silos. 
For the full potential of cyber threat intelligence to 
be realised, the sharing of data among pertinent 
actors must be facilitated. All EU Member States 
will strongly benefit from closer cooperation 
among them. Strong cyber threat intelligence  
will also empower law enforcers and national 
defence services, thereby establishing deterrence 
in the digital world.  
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European legislation, like the NIS Directive  
and the Cybersecurity Act, is already paving  
the way towards nourishing the creation of several 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) 
and public-private partnerships within the EU. 
The creation of sectorial ISACs at the national 
level could accelerate the collaboration between 
industry, government and law enforcement  
(ENISA, 2020a). 
To this end, three main pillars should be 
established. A common strategy must be defined,  
including all willing actors, to clarify what can be  
achieved and how it has to be done. Interoperability  
needs to be considered from the very beginning 
to facilitate all the exchanges and standardise 
the way to process the information gathered. 
Implementation of the system must ensure  
the security and privacy of all the gathered data 
without hindering its development.
The establishment of a general culture of 
collaboration in this field would have a positive 
cascading effect on all areas. Encouraging, or  
obliging the reporting of any cyber incident,  
would facilitate the setting up of better 
safeguards, benefit other players, and more 
broadly nurture other communities, thereby 
improving the overall situation. An action toward 
this goal is the establishment of a European 
central platform for vulnerability management 
coordinating and encouraging the efforts of  
the cybersecurity community to improve  
the overall security level of the digital world. 
In the last years many advocated, in this context, 
on the need for a ‘Digital Geneva Convention’, 
covering the cyberspace. Many claimed that  
the Geneva Convention was conceived in 1949,  
for completely different reasons and there is  
no need to extend it to cyberspace. Nevertheless,  
as demonstrated by the cyber threats raised  
during the COVID-19 crisis, it is now the time for  
an international reflection on the digital space,  
its protection and the rules governing its security.
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 8.1.6 Ensure secure policy by design
We need to go further. Instead, we should be 
building a secure digital European society with 
the security-by-design principle understood  
as a general philosophy for the digital era,  
not simply as a mere product-design practice. 
Consequently, we should also ensure that  
our governance and policymaking practices 
start to adhere to this principle. As digital 
permeates across more and more areas of policy 
and law making, practices should guarantee  
that cybersecurity considerations are built into  
the policymaking and governance processes  
from the outset. 
To this end, measures should be considered to 
develop a coordinated European framework 
for the full alignment of cybersecurity policy 
initiatives and actions at EU and Member-State 
level. It should cover all the relevant areas listed 
in this chapter, ranging from fundamental rights 
to international collaboration. Such an initiative 
will be key in ensuring the harmonisation and 
homogenisation of cybersecurity across Europe 
and will be a significant step towards building  
a secure digital society for all European citizens.
 
 8.2. Elevating Europe to Cybersecurity 
 2.0 – our digital anchor 
The European Commission has proposed  
a digital transformation that works for all. 
Within this ambitious strategy, there is a strong 
acknowledgement that such a transformation has 
cybersecurity embedded at its core. We have seen 
in this report that it covers a wide range of issues 
from trust in digital products, ensuring relevant 
cooperation between Member States, developing 
cyber resilience, deploying new tools against  
cyber criminals, to raising citizens’ awareness  
of cybersecurity. We have also witnessed  
the ever-present vulnerabilities to malicious cyber 
attacks, illustrated in particular by the weaknesses 
exploited during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Implementing the above recommendations,  
with cybersecurity as our digital anchor,  
will help our society achieve a successful  
digital transformation.
   In a new reality 
where physical 
and digital 
blend together, 
cybersecurity is  
the trust anchor  
of our society.
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 AI Artificial intelligence
 APT Advance persistent threats
 ARPANET Advanced Research Projects Agency Network
 CaaS Crime-as-a-Service
 CC Common Criteria
 CEH Certified ethical hacker
 CISM Certified information security manager
 CISSP Certified information systems security professional
 CRI  Cyber Readiness Index
 CSPN Certification de Sécurité de Premier Niveau
 CSIRT Computer security incident response team
 CTI Cyber threat intelligence
 DDoS Distributed denial of service
 DNS Domain name system
 DNSSEC  Domain name system security extensions
 DoD  Department of Defense
 DoS Denial of service
 EC3 European Cybercrime Centre
 ECSO European Cyber Security Organisation
 ENISA European Union Agency for Cybersecurity
 EU European Union
 FSTEK  Federal Service for Technical and Export Control 
 GDPR General Data Protection Regulation
 HLEG High-level Expert Group
 ICT Information and communications technology
 IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
 IOCTA  Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment
 IoMT Internet of Medical Things
 IoT Internet of Things
 IP Internet protocol
 ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center
 ISMS Information security management system
 ISO International Organization for Standardization
 ITU  International Telecommunications Union 
 JRC Joint Research Centre
 MDR Medical Devices Regulation
 MS Member State
List of abbreviations
LIST OF 
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 NAO National Audit Office 
 NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 NCSS  National cyber security strategies
 NHS National Health and Social Care system
 NIS Network and information systems
 NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
 NISTIR NIST Interagency/Internal Report
 OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
 OS Operating system
 PII Personally identifiable information
 PPP Public-private partnership
 SME  Small and medium-sized enterprise
 SSL Secure sockets Layer
 TOE Target of evaluation
 USA United States of America
 VPN  Virtual Private Network 
 WEF  World Economic Forum
 WHO  World Health Organization
 WWW World Wide Web
List of abbreviations and glossary
Accessibility  
(ISO/IEC TR 13066-2:2016) Degree to which a computer 
system is easy to use by all people, including those  
with disabilities.
Access control  
(ISO/IEC 27000) Means to ensure that access to  
assets is authorised and restricted based on business  
and ßsecurity requirements.
(FIPS 201-1) The process of granting or denying  
specific requests: 1) for obtaining and using information 
and related information-processing services; and 2) to enter 
specific physical facilities (e.g. federal buildings, military 
establishments, and border-crossing entrances.
Accountability 
(ISO/IEC 2382:2015) Property that ensures that the 
actions of an entity may be traced uniquely to that entity.
Acquisition
(NIST SP 800-160) Process of obtaining a system, product  
or service.
 
Assurance  
(ISO/IEC 15026) Grounds for justified confidence that  
a claim has been or will be achieved. Note 1: assurance  
is typically obtained relative to a set of specific claims.  
The scope and focus of such claims may vary (e.g. security 
claims, safety claims) and the claims themselves may 
be interrelated. Note 2: assurance is obtained through 
techniques and methods that generate credible evidence  
to substantiate claims.
Audit
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Systematic, independent  
and documented process for obtaining audit evidence  
and evaluating it objectively to determine the extent to  
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which the audit criteria are fulfilled. (An audit can be  
an internal audit, an external audit, or a combined audit.)
(ISA 62443-1-2) Independent review and examination  
of records and activities to assess the adequacy of system 
controls, to ensure compliance with established policies 
and operational procedures, and to recommend necessary 
changes in controls, policies or procedures.
Asymmetric cryptographic algorithm 
(NIST SP 800-133) A cryptographic algorithm that uses 
two related keys, a public key and a private key, both of 
which have the property that determining the private key 
from the public key is computationally infeasible – also 
known as a public-key algorithm.
Attack and cyber attack
Attack: (ISO/IEC 27000:2016) attempt to destroy, expose, 
alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorised access to or make 
unauthorised use of an asset.
Cyber attack: (NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4) an attack, via 
cyberspace, targeting an enterprise’s use of cyberspace 
for the purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, 
or maliciously controlling a computing environment/
infrastructure, or destroying the integrity of the data, or 
stealing controlled information.
Authentication 
(ISO/IEC 27000) Provision of assurance that a claimed 
characteristic of an entity is correct.
(FIPS 200) Verifying the identity of a user, process  
or device, often as a prerequisite to allowing access to 
resources in an information system.
Availability
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Being accessible and usable upon 
demand by an authorised entity.
(FIPS 200) Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use  
of information. 
Biometrics 
(ISO/TR 18307:2001) Use of specific attributes that reflect 
unique personal characteristics, such as a fingerprint,  
an eye blood-vessel print, or a voice print, to validate the 
identity of entities.(NIST SP 800-63-3) Automated recognition 
of individuals based on their biological  
and behavioural characteristics.
Certification
(Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on ENISA, the ‘EU Cybersecurity 
Agency’) Certification comprises the formal evaluation of 
products, services and processes by an independent and 
accredited body against a defined set of criteria standards 
and the issuing of a certificate indicating conformance. 
Certification serves the purpose of informing and reassuring 
purchasers and users about the security properties of  
the products and services that they buy or use.
(FIPS 200) A comprehensive assessment of the management, 
operational and technical security controls in an information 
system, made in support of security accreditation, to determine 
the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, 
operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with 
respect to meeting the security requirements for the system.
Collection  
(ISO/IEC 27037:2012) Process of gathering the physical 
items that contain potential digital evidence.
Confidentiality
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Whereby information is not made 
available or disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities  
or processes.
(FIPS 200) Preserving authorised restrictions on information 
access and disclosure, including means for protecting 
personal privacy and proprietary information.
Conformity
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Fulfilment of a requirement. 
Cryptanalysis 
(ISO/IEC 7498-2:1989, definition 3.3.18 and ISO/IEC 
18033-1 2015) The analysis of a cryptographic system  
and/or its inputs and outputs to derive confidential variables 
and/or sensitive data, including cleartext.
(NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 4) Operations performed  
to defeat cryptographic protection without initial knowledge 
of the key employed in providing the protection. 
Cryptology 
(Computer Security, Dieter Gollmann, John Wiley  
and Sons) Cryptology groups together the definition  
of cryptography (i.e. ‘the science of secret writing’)  
and cryptanalysis (i.e. the science of ‘breaking ciphers’).  
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For the scope of this taxonomy, this domain includes  
not only the mathematical foundations but also  
the technical implementations of cryptographic algorithms 
and architectures, as well as the implementation of 
cryptanalytic methodologies, techniques and tools.
(CNSSI 4009-2015) The mathematical science that deals 
with cryptanalysis and cryptography.
Cryptographic hash function
(NIST SP 800-106) A function that maps a bit string of 
arbitrary length to a fixed-length bit string and is expected 
to have the following three properties: 1) collision resistance 
(see collision resistance); 2) preimage resistance (see 
preimage resistance); and 3) second preimage resistance.
Cybercrime
(ISO/IEC 27032:2012) A criminal activity in which services 
or applications in cyberspace are used for or are the target 
of a crime, or where the cyberspace is the source, tool, 
target or place of a crime.
Cybersecurity
(ISO/IEC 27032:2012) Preservation of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information in cyberspace.
(NISTIR 8183) The process of protecting information  
by preventing, detecting and responding to attacks.
(ITU-T, X.1205) The collection of tools, policies, security 
concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk-management 
approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance 
and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber 
environment and organisation and users’ assets.
Cyberspace
(ISO/IEC 27032:2012) The complex environment resulting 
from the interaction of people, software and services on 
the internet by means of technology devices and networks 
connected to it, which does not exist in any physical form.
(NIST SP 800-30 Rev. 1) A global domain within  
the information environment comprising the interdependent 
network of information system infrastructures, including  
the internet, telecommunications networks, computer 
systems, and embedded processors and controllers.
Data
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Collection of values assigned to 
base measures, derived measures and/or indicators.
(NIST SP 800-88 Rev. 1) Pieces of information from which 
‘understandable information’ is derived.
Digital evidence 
(ISO/IEC 27037:2012) Information or data, stored  
or transmitted in binary form that may be relied on  
as evidence.
Digital signature
(NIST SP 800-63-2) An asymmetric key operation where 
the private key is used to digitally sign data and the public 
key is used to verify the signature. Digital signatures  
provide authenticity protection, integrity protection,  
and non-repudiation.
Digital rights management
(ISO/IEC 5127:2017) Digital technology that is separate to 
the product form of a specific digital publication and which 
is used to control access to content.
Distributed system
(Coulouris, George, Jean Dollimore, Tim Kindberg  
and Gordon Blair (2011), Distributed Systems: Concepts 
and Design (5th edition), Boston, Addison-Wesley, ISBN 
0-132-14301-1) A distributed system is a model in which 
components located on networked computers communicate 
and coordinate their actions by passing messages. In this  
context, cybersecurity deals with all aspects of coordination, 
message integrity, availability and (if required) confidentiality. 
Message authentication is also within the scope.
Documented information
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Information required to be controlled 
and maintained by an organisation and the medium in which 
it is contained.
eIDAS 
(Regulation (EU) No 910/2014) EU regulation proposed 
to ensure that people and businesses can use their own 
national electronic identification schemes (eIDs) to access 
public services in other EU countries where eIDs are available.
Effectiveness
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) The extent to which planned 
activities are realised and planned results achieved.
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Event
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Occurrence or change in a particular 
set of circumstances.
Executive management
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Person or group of people who  
have been delegated responsibility by the governing body  
to implement strategies and policies to accomplish  
the purpose of the organisation.
Governance of information security
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) A system by which an organisation’s  
information security activities are directed and controlled. 
Governing body
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Person or group of people who  
are accountable for the performance and conformance  
of the organisation. 
Hash function 
(ISO/IEC 10118-1:2016) Hash functions map strings of 
bits of variable (but usually upper-bounded) length to fixed-
length strings of bits, using a specified algorithm. They can 
be used to reduce a message to a short imprint for input 
into a digital signature mechanism, and to commit the user 
to a given string of bits without revealing this string. 
Human error 
Mistakes that unwittingly create opportunities for cyber 
attackers to exploit. 
Identity 
(NIST SP 800-79-2) The set of physical and behavioural 
characteristics by which an individual is uniquely recognisable. 
Identity management 
(ISO/IEC 24760-1:2011) Processes and policies  
involved in managing the life cycle and value, type  
and optional metadata of attributes in identities known  
in a particular domain.  
Indicator
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) A measure that provides an 
estimate or evaluation of specified attributes derived from 
an analytical model with respect to defined information 
needs (2.31).
Identification
(NIST SP 800-79-2) The process of discovering the true 
identity (i.e. origin, initial history) of a person or item from 
the entire collection of similar people or items.
Information security
(FIPS 200) The protection of information and information 
systems from unauthorised access, use, disclosure, 
disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide 
confidentiality, integrity and availability.
Information security continuity
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Processes and procedures for 
ensuring continued information security operations.
Information security incident
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) A single or a series of unwanted  
or unexpected information security events that have  
a significant probability of compromising business 
operations and threatening information security.
Information security incident management
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Processes for detecting, reporting, 
assessing, responding to, dealing with, and learning from 
information security incidents.
Information system
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Applications, services,  
information technology assets, or other information-
handling components.
Integrity and data integrity
Integrity: (ISO/IEC 27000:2016) demonstrating accuracy 
and completeness.
Data integrity: (NIST SP 800-63-3) whereby that data 
has not been altered by an unauthorised entity.
 
ISMS project
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Structured activities undertaken by 
an organisation (definition 2.57) to implement an ISMS.
 
Key management 
(ISO/IEC 11770-1:2010 PART 1, definition 2.28) 
Administration and use of generation, registration, 
certification, deregistration, distribution, installation, storage, 
archiving, revocation, derivation and destruction of keying 
material in accordance with a security policy.  
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Level of risk
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Magnitude of a risk (definition 2.68) 
expressed in terms of the combination of consequences 
(definition 2.14) and their likelihood.
 
Likelihood
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) The chance of something happening.
 
Malware
(ISO/IEC 27033-1:2015) Malicious software designed 
specifically to damage or disrupt a system, attacking 
confidentiality, integrity and/or availability.
(NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4) Software or firmware intended to 
perform an unauthorised process that will have an adverse 
impact on the confidentiality, integrity or availability of  
an information system. A virus, worm, Trojan horse, or other 
code-based entity that infects a host. Spyware and some 
forms of adware are also examples of malicious code.
 
Management system
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) A set of interrelated or interacting 
elements of an organisation to establish policies, objectives 
and processes to achieve those objectives.
 
Message authentication
(ISO/IEC 9797-1) Process to authenticate a message, often 
done through message authentication codes (string of bits 
which is the output of a MAC algorithm).
(NIST SP 800-152) A process that provides assurance of 
the integrity of messages, documents or stored data.
 
Monitoring
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Determining the status of a system, 
a process (definition 2.61) or an activity.
(NIST SP 800-160) Continual checking, supervising, 
critically observing or determining the status in order to 
identify change from the performance level required  
or expected. 
Network security 
(ISO/IEC TR 29181-5) This is concerned with the hardware, 
software, basic communication protocols, network frame 
structure, and communication mechanisms factors of  
the network. Information security in the network context 
deals with data integrity, confidentiality, availability and 
non-repudiation while it is being sent across the network.  
Non-conformity
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Non-fulfilment of a requirement. 
Non-repudiation
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) The ability to prove the occurrence 
of a claimed event for action and its originating entities. 
Organisation
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Person or group of people with  
their own functions with responsibilities, authorities  
and relationships to achieve their objectives. 
Outsource
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) An arrangement whereby  
an external organisation performs part of an organisation’s 
function or process. 
Performance
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) A measurable result. 
Personally identifiable information (PII) 
(ISO/IEC 24745:2011) Any information that identifies  
or can be used to identify, contact, or locate the person to 
whom such information pertains, from which identification 
or contact information of an individual person can be 
derived, or that is or might be directly or indirectly linked to  
a natural person.
Policy and security policy
Policy: (ISO/IEC 27000:2016) intentions and direction  
of an organisation as formally expressed by its  
top management.
Security policy: (NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 1) a set of criteria 
for the provision of security services.
Post-quantum cryptology 
(NISTIR 8105) The goal of post-quantum cryptography 
(also called quantum-resistant cryptography) is to develop 
cryptographic systems that are secure against both 
quantum and classical computers and can interoperate  
with existing communication protocols and networks. 
Preservation
(ISO/IEC 27037:2012) A process to maintain  
and safeguard the integrity and/or original condition  
of the potential digital evidence. 
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Process
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) A set of interrelated or interacting 
activities which transforms inputs into outputs.
 
Protection profile
(ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009) Implementation-independent 
statement of security needs for a TOE type. 
Privacy 
(ISO/TS 25237:2008) Freedom from intrusion into the 
private life or affairs of an individual when that intrusion 
results from the undue or illegal gathering and use of data 
about that individual.
(Westin, A., ‘Privacy and Freedom’, Atheneum, New York,  
1967) Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to 
what extent information about them is communicated to 
others. Viewed in terms of the relation of the individual to 
social participation, privacy is the voluntary and temporary 
withdrawal of a person from the general society through 
physical or psychological means, either in a state of solitude 
or small-group intimacy or, when among larger groups,  
in a condition of anonymity or reserve. 
Privacy enhancing technology (PET)
(ISO/IEC 29100:2011) Privacy control, comprising ICT 
measures, products or services, which protects privacy by 
eliminating or reducing PII or by preventing unnecessary 
and/or undesired processing of PII, all without losing  
the functionality of the ICT system.
 
Pseudonym
(RFC 6973) A name assumed by an individual in a certain 
context, unrelated to the individual's personal names known 
by others in that context, with the intention of not revealing 
the individual's identities associated with his or her other 
names. Pseudonyms are often not unique.
Pseudonymous
(RFC 6973) A property of an individual whereby that 
individual is identified by a pseudonym.
 
Pseudonymity 
(ISO/IEC 25237:2017) A particular type of de-identification 
that both removes the association with a data subject  
and adds an association between a particular set  
of characteristics relating to the data subject and one  
or more pseudonyms.
(RFC 6973) The state of being pseudonymous.
Quantum cryptography 
(ISO/TS 80004-12:2016(en), 6.6) The use of quantum 
phenomena for cryptographic purposes. 
Reliability
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Having the property of consistent 
intended behaviour and results.
 
Reputation 
(ISO/IEC 23006-4:2013) A measure of the credibility of,  
or the possibility for (e.g. legal) a user to be a party to  
a transaction.
 
Requirement
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) The need or expectation that is 
stated, generally implied or obligatory.
 
Residual risk
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) The risk remaining after  
risk treatment.
 
Review
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) An activity undertaken to determine 
the suitability, adequacy and effectiveness of the subject 
matter to achieve the established objectives.
Risk and cyber risk
Risk: (ISO/IEC 27000:2016) effect of uncertainty on 
objectives. In the context of information security (2.33) 
management systems, information security risks can be 
expressed as effect of uncertainty on information security 
objectives. Information security risk is associated with  
the potential that threats will exploit vulnerabilities of  
an information asset or group of information assets  
and thereby cause harm to an organisation.
Cyber risk: (NISTIR 8183) Risk of financial loss, operational 
disruption, or damage from the failure of the digital 
technologies employed for informational and/or operational 
functions introduced to a manufacturing system via 
electronic means from the unauthorised access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of  
the manufacturing system.
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Risk acceptance
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) An informed decision to take  
a particular risk.
Risk analysis
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) A process to comprehend  
the nature of risk and to determine the level of risk.
Risk assessment
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) The overall process of risk 
identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation.
Risk evaluation
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) The process of comparing  
the results of risk analysis with risk criteria to determine 
whether the risk and/or its magnitude is acceptable  
or tolerable.
Risk identification
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) The process of finding, recognising 
and describing risks.
Risk management
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Coordinated activities to direct  
and control an organisation with regard to risk.
Risk management process
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Systematic application of 
management policies, procedures and practices to  
the activities of communicating, consulting, establishing  
the context of and identifying, analysing, evaluating, 
treating, monitoring and reviewing risk.
Risk owner
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) A person or entity with  
the accountability and authority to manage a risk. 
Risk treatment
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) A process to modify risk  
(e.g. avoidance, removal, change, share, retain, mitigation). 
Scale
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) An ordered set of values, 
continuous or discrete, or a set of categories to which  
the attribute is mapped.
Security implementation standard
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) A document specifying authorised 
ways to achieve security.
Security management policy 
(ISO/IEC 28000:2007) An organisation’s overall intentions 
and direction related to the security and the framework for 
the control of security-related processes and activities that 
are derived from and consistent with the organisation’s 
policy and regulatory requirements.
Security measurement
(NIST SP800-55) Information security measures are used 
to facilitate decision-making and improve performance  
and accountability through the collection, analysis and 
reporting of relevant cybersecurity performance-related 
data. The purpose of measuring performance is to monitor 
the status of measured activities and facilitate improvement 
in those activities by applying corrective actions based on 
observed measurements.
Security-relevant event
(NISTIR 5153) Any event that attempts to change  
the security state of the system (e.g. change access controls, 
change a user’s security level, change a user’s password). 
Also, any event that attempts to violate the security policy 
of the system (e.g. too many logon attempts).
Security target
(ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009) Implementation-dependent 
statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE.
Symmetric cryptographic algorithm
(FIPS 140-2) A cryptographic algorithm that uses a single 
key (i.e. a secret key) for both encryption and decryption.
Threat and cyber threat
Threat: (ISO/IEC 27000:2016) potential cause of an 
unwanted incident, which may result in harm to a system or 
organisation.
Cyber threat: (SP 800-30 Rev. 1) any circumstance or 
event with the potential to adversely impact organisational 
operations (including mission, functions, image, or 
reputation), organisational assets, individuals, other 
organisations, or the nation through an information 
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system via unauthorised access, destruction, disclosure, 
modification of information, and/or denial of service.
Testing 
(ISO/IEC 29109-1:2009) Determination of one or more 
characteristics of an object of conformity assessment, 
according to a procedure. 
Top management
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Person or group of people directing 
and controlling an organisation at the highest level.
Trust
(ISO/IEC 25010:2011) The degree to which a user or other 
stakeholder has confidence that a product or system will 
behave as intended.
Unlinkability 
(RFC 6973) Within a particular set of information, the 
inability of an observer or attacker to determine whether 
two items of interest are related or not (with a high enough 
degree of probability to be useful to the observer or attacker).
Validation
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Confirmation, through the provision 
of objective evidence, that the requirements for a specific 
intended use or application have been fulfilled.
Verification
(ISO/IEC 27000:2016) Confirmation, through the provision 
of objective evidence, that specified requirements have been 
fulfilled.
Vetting (referred to recruitment)
(Collins Online Dictionary) Employee screening: the 
process of investigating somebody to establish their 
trustworthiness.
(NIST SP 800-163) The process of verifying that an app 
meets an organisation’s security requirements. An app 
vetting process comprises app testing and app approval/
rejection activities.
Vulnerability
(ISO/IEC 27000) The weakness of an asset or control that 
can be exploited by one or more threats.
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ENDNOTES
1 According to a recent study by FireEye, in Europe, the dwell time of a cyber attack before detection is 
increasing from 106 days to 175 days.
2 According to the OECD Digital Economy Outlook 2017 (OECD, 2017), today more than 90 % of businesses  
in the world are connected to the internet.
3 Examples of standards bringing security features into network communications include the secure software 
layer (SSL) in 1995, DNSSEC in 1997, and S/MIME for email security in 1998.
4 The 2000s decade witnessed major and contemporary evolutions at the technological level, from  
the availability of low-cost computers to the advent of home broadband and mobile connectivity. The net 
result is a much more ‘vivid’ internet with multimedia content and social media. The ‘Web 2.0’ was born.
5 Cyber-physical systems refer to systems with a software component which are capable of interacting with  
the physical world. 
6 In 2012, a major data breach hitting more than 10 million credit cards opened a series of large cybercrime 
attacks (Krebs, 2012), followed by the Yahoo data breach which hit more than 400 million accounts (Volz, 2016). 
We could also mention the Sony PlayStation attack (Quinn and Arthur, 2011), the Adobe attack (Welch, 2013), 
Ashley Madison (2015) (Zetter, 2015) and more recently Equifax (2017) (Federal Trade Commission, 2020) 
data breaches that each put the data of millions of users at stake.
7 Several suicides were reported as a result of the massive personal data breach in the Ashley Madison case 
(Baraniuk, 2015). The Sony PlayStation hack was also considered to have had a negative influence on 
consumers’ trust in the e-market for digital services.
8 In 2017, the European Commission published the Communication ‘Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: 
Building strong cybersecurity for the EU’ whereby it outlines its plan to face the current cybersecurity 
challenges by proposing actions linked to the protection of systems, networks and services, the prosecution  
of crimes and the defence area.
9 Whereas ‘the cyberspace’ is defined as ‘the complex environment resulting from the interaction of people, 
software and services on the internet by means of technology devices and networks connected to it, which 
does not exist in any physical form’.
10 Article 7 (respect for private and family life) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
11 Article 4 of the GDPR (principles relating to processing of personal data) states that personal data shall 
be ‘processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection 
against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using 
appropriate technical or organisational measures (“integrity and confidentiality”)’. Further, article 32 (security 
of processing), requires that both data controller and processor implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures to ensure the security of personal data, following a risk-based approach.
12 ENISA published a comprehensive map of MS cybersecurity strategies (ENISA, 2020b).
13 Although such systems have not always been referred to as ‘artificial intelligence’.
14 In contrast to classical information technologies based in semiconductor devices for which quantum physics 
only provides a background understanding of the materials being used. 
15 In cybersecurity, the term attack surface refers to the collection of all potential entry points that attackers 
could use to compromise services, systems or information by using vulnerabilities.
16 There are always cases of threat actors offering their crime as a service and therefore looking for money. 
However, in such cases, it is the sponsor of the attack who is driven by ideals.
17 Dashboards that provide up-to-date information on the virus have been created by several organisations.  
For instance, some pieces of malware are disguised as a ‘Coronavirus map’ to spread them effectively.
18 This was done to lure recipients to websites to download malware on their systems.
19 The classical example is that of a building in a neighbourhood that one day appears with a window broken. 
Days pass by without the window being fixed then, at some point, another window appears broken, which is 
then followed up by many more in the following days. Eventually, other more serious offences start to develop 
around that building.
20 Cybersecurity products, such as antiviruses, firewalls, intrusion detection systems or vulnerability scanners,  
are effective in the identification and prevention of some types of attack.
21 In software, security-by-default requires that the default configuration settings are the most secure settings 
possible, without even the end-user knowing it is there or having to enable it. For example, a social networking 
site should set users’ profile settings in the most privacy-friendly option in an effort to limit from the onset 
the accessibility of the users’ profiles to third persons. The interested reader should also refer to the ‘Establish 
secure defaults’ security principle as defined by the Open Web Application Security Project.
22 The SOG-IS agreement was produced in response to the EU Council Decision of 31 March 1992 (92/242/EEC) 
in the field of security of information systems, and the subsequent Council Recommendation of 7 April 1995 
(1995/144/EC) on common information technology security evaluation criteria.
23 Note that ‘system functionality’ is intentionally left as a general term and could stand for a wide range of 
notions, such as service operability, business income, trust in the service or public institution, etc.
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